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In light of the retirement phenomena, the development and utilization
of private pensions may be viewed as a market response based on individual and
collective recognition of the need to plan to finance retirement from the labor
force.

This market response however, is shown to have produced a profusion of

independent differential pension schemes which may vary with respect to t!leir
administrative mechanisms, the type and adequacy of benefits paid, the level
at which contributions are made to the plan by participants and the basis of
these contributions, and the adequacy of fundine.

As a result, it is not only
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difficult to generalize about the nature of pensions, but the response of
private pensions to changing market conditions and the nature of factors
affecting the stability of private pensions are variable and diverse.
This paper seeks to examine the stability of private pensions in the
context of a dynamic market system through the development and examination of
two labor force and pension models.

The first lahor force model considered

is that of a stationary labor force which is assumed to be absolutely stable
over time with respect to its size and age-composition.

The stationary labor

force is further assumed to be facing an absolutely stable market demand for
its services over time.

A private pension plan was designed to provide post-

retirement income to retirees of the stationary labor force; and it was found
that the stationary labor force's pension plan has an absolutely stable level
of liabilities over time.

Three funding programs to finance the stationary

labor force's model pension plan are presented and assessed.

A second labor

force model was then developed based upon a case study of the West Coast Longshore industry labor force.

This labor force was shown to be shrinking in size

and becoming progressively older as a result of changes in the market demand
for longshore services.

This reduction in the demand for longshoremen is shmm

to be the result of rapid technological change in the production processes in
the industry and the result of the impact on

la~or

force

de~and

of exogenous

factors such as wars, fluctuations in general economic activity and the entry
of

forei~

competitors into the :narket.

r:rithout the ability to predict the

occurance of these phenonena an<l their effects on the demand for longshorenen
it is s!1own that an adequate pension plan to cover

t~e

needs of the labor force is not likely to be designed.

post-retirement income
It is further shown

3

that even in the event that these uncertainties were predictable, the cost
of financing an adequate pension plan would be prohibitive to the establishment of a plan to cover the retirees of a shrinking labor force like the
West Coast Longshoremen.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This paper concerns private pension and retirement plans and their
application in a market economy.

Its purpose is to examine the relevance

and characteristics of pensions; to simulate their operation; and to demonstrate through a case study, a central weakness of private pension systems.
Over the past thirty years public interest in pensions has increased
sharply with much of this interest developing within the past decade.

There

are a range of phenomena which have been associated with the public's
awakening to the opportunities and problems provided by pensions.

Sometimes

cited in this regard is the impact of WWII on the supply and demand for labor
in the economy; i.e., by increasing demand for labor while wage stabilization
policies were in effect, and thereby forcing firms to compete for labor with
non-wage benefits such as pensions.

Also contributing to the growing public

interest in pensions is the increasing prevelance of retirement and early
retirement from the labor force.

This subject will be dealt with in some

detail in a later portion of this paper.

Another factor to be noted is the

U.S. Supreme Court ruling of 1948 which stated that pensions were "deferred
wages" and therefore subject to collective bargaining.
While it is impossible to separate the impacts of these three factors
from each other, and from other phenomena to enable us to explain the increasing interest in pensions, it is possible to state in general. the cause
of the mounting interest.

First, there has been increasing reliance upon
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the pension instrument throughout the economy; a fact seen in the increasing
number of participants in plans and the increasing assets of plans.

Secondly,

the public has become aware of the use of fund assets; the increasing size
of these assets have established large pools of wealth which are neither
strictly private nor public and therefore, arouses questions of ownership and
control.
Academic and economic interest in so called "life-cycle economics"
in which pensions play a significant role, has to some degree been influenced
by the growth of gerontology as a multi-disciplinary field involving economists.
The role of the economist in gerontology with respect to pensions has been
basically three-fold.

First, since the pension is a financial instrument,

economists are concerned with the mechanics of the plan itself.

That is,

we may seek to answer questions such as, is a particular plan sound, or are
the assumptions upon which it is based valid?

Secondly, the economist is

concerned with the effect of the plan on the individual.

This level of con-

cern contains a range of issues from; the allocation of earnings over the
life-cycle as opposed to the individual's work-life, to issues such as the
adequacy of the benefits provided by a plan.

Finally, the economist inves-

tigates the relationships between the pension system and

mac~o-economic

var-

iables such as income, consumption, investment, savings, employment, labor
force size and composition.
Since the concern of this paper is the application of pensions in the
context of a dynamic market system, its focus is essentially in the final
set of issues outlined above.

This is, we are concerned with the relationship

between the operation of pensions and their fundamental assumptions regarding
the covered labor force.

To succeed in this task, however, requires that
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consideration also be given to the first two sets of issues as well.

For

this reason, this paper has been organized as follows.
The discussion begins with a brief review of retirement, the patterns
and trends of retirement, and the fundamental economic consequences of retirement for an individual.

The following chapters deal with pensions.

In the

third chapter a typology of pensions is presented; and in the fourth, three
pension funding models are developed.

In the fifth chapter the funding

models are applied to a model of a declining labor force based upon the west
coast longshore industry labor force.

In conclusion, the sixth chapter will

discuss the application of the funding models and their relevance to the
general use of private pensions.

CHAPTER II
RETIREMENT
Underlying the public interest in the financial status of pensions is
retirement.

Obviously enough, if workers did not retire and continued to

work, pensions would have limited usefulness and would be of little interest.
There may still be interest in pensions as a means of supplementing earnings
in old age when productivity is presumed to diminish, but more than any other
single factor, retirement has contributed to the development of the pension
system and our present concern for its adequacy.
The increasing prevalence of retirement from the labor force can be
seen on Graph 1, which shows the decline in labor force participation among
men 65 and over from the year 1900 to 1970.

In terms of the corresponding

rate of retirement from the labor force, from 1900, when only 36.9% of men
65 and older were retired, retirement has increased steadily with the exception of during the WWII decade, to 74.2% in 1970.

The fluctuation in the

retirement rate in the 1940-50 decade is attributable to the tight labor
market during the war.

While retirement did increase slightly in an absolute

sense during this decade, 0.8% decennially, this increase is minor relative
to the preceding and succeeding periods.

During the 1930-40 decade, when

the Social Security Act was passed, the decennial increase in retirement was
11.8%, from 46% to 57.8% for the largest decennial increase.

From 1950-60

retirement increased 9.2% to 67.7%, and during the 1960-70 retirement
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Labor Force Participation for Men over 65 and Life
Expectancy at Birth, Male Caucasians, 1900-1970
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increased 6.4% so that 74.2% of men 65 and over were retired in 1970.
This increase in retirement rates has resulted from a variety of causes;
including legislation such as the Social Security Act and laws establishing
mandatory retirement for public employees, and the private actions of firms
and unions establishing retirement policies.

Underlying these attempts to

encourage retirement however, are the declining labor needs of our industrial
economy.

As a result of the increasing productivity of both labor and capital

in our economy, legislating retirement, as in 1935, has become viewed as a
means for reducing unemployment.

Thus retirement, to some extent, may be

viewed as a cosmetic for unemployment.
In industrial economies one result of technological change has been
the reduction of the man-hours of labor required to produce a given level of

1.

U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the U.S.: Colonial Times
to 1957 (Series Bl9-30, Washington D.C., 1960)p.71. & U.S. Bureau of
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970 {9lst ed., Washington,
D.C., 1971) p. 214, Table No. 317.
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of output.

Thus, to maintain full or near full employment it has been

necessary to adopt various measures which will distribute the work to be
done among as many workers as possible.

This has been accomplished through

various means, including the shortening of the number of work hours in a
normal work day, increasing the number and length of vacations or leisure
time, by delaying labor force entry through public education requirements and
increasing emphasis on post-secondary education, and by redefining the un3
employed a~ed as retired.
For an individual an obvious result of retirement is the reduction of
his ability to earn an income.

Unless the indivdual's source of income

before retirement is property, in which case the word retirement hardly
applies, the individual is faced with limited options.
tain an adequate standard of living in retirement the

To be able to mainindivi~ual

must either

plan or save for a lengthy period of time, he May purchase an insurance
policy, or he may participate in a pension plan.

In any case the retiree

must have anticipated retirement, and it is preferable for the retiree to
have done all three of the above.
If the retiree is unable to maintain an adequate level of income
there are of course, public income maintenance programs which will give
financial aid to the destitute elderly.

No public income maintenance program

however, including the Social Security Administration's Retirement and

2.
3.

Juanita Kreps, Lifetime Allocation of Work and Income (Duke University
Press, 1971) p. 39-41.
Alfred Sauvy, General Theory of Population (Basic Books, New York, N.Y.,
1969) p. 148.
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Survivors Insurance Benefits, provides or was intended to provide the
recipients of its aid with an adequate level of income.

4
It remains to the

individual to provide himself with an adequate level of retirement income.
This situation is partially the result of our Anglo-American heritage,
finding its roots in the Elizabethan period when state assistance to the poor
5

began with the Act of 1563.

English settlers in America brought with them

the principle that those who could support themselves or secure support from
relatives were not eligible for public relief.

The present Social Security

system in the U.S., and other forms of public relief, notable the Old Age
Assistance program and the newer Supplemental Security Income program, were
established in recognition of the fact that old age and retirement inay prohibit
the elderly individual from working to support himself.

However, since some

elderly individuals are well able to support themselves in retirement, either
through the prudent accumulation of income producing assets or by participation in a pension plan or simply saving in anticipation of retirement, or by
securing support from relatives, the state has refrained from providing
adequate retirement incomes to the elderly in order to maintain incentives for
pre-retirement planning by individuals.

Thus, it may be said that as a result

of traditional attitudes regarding state vis-a-vis individual responsibility
for income maintenance, and as a result of the increasing prevalence of retirement, the pension has emerged as the major means available to individuals
for providing themselves with an adequate level of post-retirement income.
One important factor augmenting the need for pensions is the increasing
life expectancy of the U.S. resident.

4.
5.

This trend is also plotted on Graph 1

"Role of Public and Private Programs in Old Age Income Assurance", Old Age
Income Assurance (Part 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, 1968) p. 45.
Christopher Green Negative Taxes and the Poverty Problem (Brookings Inst.:
Washington, DC, 1967) p. 34.
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and is measured on the right vertical axis.

The life expectancy of white

males at birth has increased from approximately 48 years in 1900 to 67 years
in 1970, thus indicating that on the average, a white male born in 1970 can
expect at least two years of retirement.

This fact is somewhat overshadowed

by the similar statistic for white females.

Although not shown on Graph 1,

life expectancy at birth for white females in 1970 was approximately 70 years,
indicating that on the average, a white female born in 1970 can look forward
6

to approximately 13 years of retirement after age 62.
These statistics on life expectancy at birth illustrate the growth of
the need for post-retirement income schemes with increasing longevity over
almost three-quarters of the 20th century.

However, they do not show the

necessity of retirement financial planning, this can be seen more clearly
by looking at figures for life expectancy at retirement age.

A white male

retiring at age 65 in 1970 could actuarily expect to live an additional 13
years or until age 78.

And a white female retiring at age 62 in 1970,

could expect to live an average of 18.8 years or almost until age 81.

In

addition, over the range of chronological age for which actuarial estimates
are accurate, an individual's age-specific life expectancy in years decreases
at a rate of less than 1 year for every year a person lives.

Thus, if a

male aged 65 could expect to live to age 78, at age 66 he can expect to live
7
until age 78.5, and at age 67 he can expect to live to be 78.9.
In other
words, on the average, for every year a person ages, their expected age at
death is older than it was the previous_year.

6.
7.

Statistical Abstract of the Unitted
Ibid.

States,~·

cit., p. 54.
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Thus, we can see that a combination of these long run trends, that is,
increasing retirement rates and increasing longevity have made pre-retirement
financial planning a necessity.

Especially in light of the fact that the odds

are greater than 2:1 at birth that an individual will reach retirement age;
and that in that event, depending upon the individual's sex, he or she can
look forward to an average of 13 and 18 years of retirement respectively.

In

financial terms, using the U.S. Bureau of Census' 1969 poverty line budget
for an individual, a single male retiring at age 65 will need $23,400, and
a female retiring at age 62 will need $33,840 for future consumption just to
live in poverty.

A retired couple, assllJ'ling that they retire at the same

time, would need $60,716 for future consumption using the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics lower budget for a retired couple in 1972 ($3,442 per year).
To maintain the intermediate budget ($4,967 per year) will require $87,617
for future consumption, and a higher budget ($7,689 per year) will require
8
$135,633.
In light of the fact that the prospective cost of retirement
increases as the retiree ages and the enormity of these sums to members of
lower income groups, if left to private savings to provide post-retirement
income, it is doubtful that this income could be provided.
The task of providing post-retirement income for the growing number
of retired elderly has been approached in several ways in the U.S.

On the

national level is the Social Security system, a social insurance plan designed
to provide a basic, though not adequate, level of benefits to retired workers
who have contributed to the insurance fund for at least forty quarters over
9

their work life.

8.
9.

"Three Budgets for a Retired Couple", Autumn, 1972, USBLS, USDL 73-367.
Individuals born before 1929 have a lower contribution requirement.
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Because the coverage of the Social Security system is not, nor was it
ever intended to be, universal; categorical assistance programs have been
developed to cover those aged who have not participated in the Social Security
system.

The Old Age Assistance program and more recently, the Supplemental

Security Income program have been designed to provide universal financial aid
to the elderly poor.

The Supplemental Security Income program, the newer

federally funded replacement for the locally administered Old Age Assistance
programs provides a guaranteed minimum income for all elderly, blind and
totally and permanently disabled persons.
None of these attempts by government to provide financial aid to the
elderly however, provide an adequate level of retirement income for the elderly,
or 60-70% of their pre-retirement income.

Thus to secure an adequate post-

retirement income the individual must take private actions; actions for which
the individual has several options.

The first and most obvious of these

options is that of personal savings.

A second option, and one relied on by

many individuals is life insurance.

And the third option, that used increas-

ingly, is the pension; which is a combination to some extent of personal
savings and insurance.
The outcome of these strategies for providing post-retirement income,
social insurance, categorical assistance and the various means available to
individuals, is a system in which the individual is assured of basic support
but must assume the risks inherent in providing an adequate level of postretirement income.

Consequently, the individual gambles that the means he

selects to provide an adQquate income twenty to forty years in the future,
will work

out as planned.

This gamble has enormous consequences for the
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individual in retirement, for should his plans for the provision of an
adequate income fail altogether or in part, the social and psychological
impact is substantial.

Before turning to the pension in more detail it will

be useful to explore these consequences further.
Underlying the need for post-retirement income are the human needs for
consumption, which obviously do not cease at age 65.

Many studies of retired

persons, past and present, have been directed at determining life satisfaction
among the elderly.

Although life satisfaction is an extremely complex var-

iable, dependent upon a range of related variables, one variable or set of
variables has been closely correlated to life satisfaction among the elderly,
and that variable is socio-economic status.

Among the elderly, socio-economic

status variables, e.g. education, occupational status and family income,
prove to be the most efficient indicators of life satisfaction, with family
10
Thus, the essential nature
income being the most efficient among these.
of post-retirement income provision and planning becomes clearer still, as
does the need for an adequate pension system.

In summary, these needs have

resulted from declining labor needs in the economy leading to increasing
retirement, increasing longevity thus longer period of retirement and finally,
the impact of inadequate post-retirement income on the individual welfare of
the elderly.

10. John N. Edwards and David L. Klemmack Journal of Gerentology, 1973, Vol.
28, No. 4, pp. 497-502.

CHAPTER III
A TYPOLOGY OF PENSIONS
In the second chapter the development of demand for post-retirement income
maintenance programs was traced.

It was shown that a number of factors in ad-

dition to the increasing incidence of retirement, have stimulated the demand
for an adequate retirement income provision system in industrialized economies.
The market has responded to this demand with the development of private pension plans, which have grown significantly in the past decades.

The growth

of private pensions can be viewed in a number of ways; in terms of the number
of individuals covered or participating in pension plans, the growth of assets
held by private pension plans and the proliferation of pension programs with
varying characteristics.
In 1940 slightly more than four million workers were covered by private
pensions and almost 1-1/2 million by federal, state and local government employee
pensions, yielding a total of 5.5 million employees covered by pensions.
Three decades later, in 1970, approximately 8 million government employees were
covered and almost 30 million other workers were covered by private insured
and non-insured pension plans.

Hence the coverage of pensions has increased by

more than seven-fold in the thirty years since 1940.
assets held by private pensions have grown similarly.

In the same period,
From a level in 1940 of

$2.4 billion in assets held by private plans, the book value of assets held
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11
by private insured and non-insured plans has increased to over $137 billion.
With the growth of private pension and retirement plans in terms of
coverage and assets held, pensions have been applied to various types of employee groups with numerous modifications.

Because of this latter development,

it is very difficult to speak in general about pensions, since they may differ
with respect to the manner in which the plan is administered, and/or the level
of benefits or the manner in which the benefits are paid, and/or the manner
in which the plan is financed.

Thus, for an assessment of individual pension

plans or pension plans in general, it is useful to begin with a definition of
the basic element of pensions, and some suggested criteria for evaluation of
pensions.

The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to develop a typology of

pensions to allow for a more explicit assessment of pensions and finally, in
Chapter IV, to develop a pension fund model.
The variety of types of plans or financial instruments which are connnonly
referred to as "pensions" is one aspect of their study that confuses students
and baffles laymen when attempting to assess a plan or its soundness.

Basic

to the understanding of pensions therefore, is a definition of the set of
concepts incorporated in pensions; and from this basis, the development of a
typology of pensions.
Another result of the diversity of pension plans is that a definition
must be very broad to be inclusive of all financial instruments that are
called pensions.

11.

In general, pensions are simply legal or financial instruments,

Daniel H. Holland, Private Pension Funds: Projected Growth; Occasional Paper
97 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1966) pp. 2-3; & U.S. Bureau of
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972, Tables /!467, 468,
470, and 471.
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which are also organizations, and are evidence of an agreement among two
or more parties to provide post-retirement income to individuals designated
as beneficiaries under the plan.
to all pension plans.

As such, there are three elements basic

1) Administration.

the agreement the participants of the plan.

The plan administrator executes
2) Benefits.

The plan admin-

istrator pays benefits (monetary or in-kind) to individuals who are beneficiaries under the plan agreement; these are the principle liabilities incurred by the plan.

3) Contributions.

Contributions must be paid to the

plan administrator to meet the liabilities incurred under the plan agreement.
The source of these funds is also specified in the plan agreement.
On the basis of these definitions, the fact that pensions are not
complex is easily seen; and to illustrate their basic simplicity they maybe
compared to a sink or a bathtub.
while its drain is open.

Imagine a sink with water flowing into it

In terms of this analogy, contributions to the plan

are represented by the water flowing into the sink through the faucet, and
benefits are represented by the water flowing out of the sink through the drain.
Further, the function of the plan adminstrator is to regulate the inflow of
contributions and the outflow of benefits.
Some plans, as it will be discussed, specify that the outflow of benefits
and the inflow of contributions be equal.

In this case, in terms of the analogy,

the inflow of water equals the outflow and no water is stored in the sink.
In real terms, this situation indicates that the plan has no fund.

On the other

hand some plan agreements specify, or the age structure of the covered labor
force may necessitate, that contributions paid to the plan be greater than the
benefits paid by the plan at some point in time.

In this case, in terms of the

15

analogy the inflow of water from the faucet into the sink is greater than the
outflow of fluid through the drain, and hence the sink becomes a reservoir
or fund to be released as benefits in the future.
The first plan discussed above, where contributions are equal to benefits
paid is the simplest pension in our typology.

Called an "unfunded pension"

or sometimes a "pay-as-you-go plan" for obvious reasons, participants in
unfunded plans have no security in the plan other than the adminstrator's
(generally the employer's) promise to pay a specified benefit in the future.
Hence in the past, "pay-as-you-go" plans have been notorious· for involving
higher risks of failure when employers other than government have been involved.
Distinguished from unfunded plans are funded plans, and obviously enough,
they are called funded plans because beneficiaries of the plan have claims on
specific assets in addition to the plan adminstrator's promise to pay.

A

primary distinction between funded plans or pension funds is the degree of
funding each plan has.
partially-funded.

That is, some plans are fully-funded, while other are

The principle difference between fully- and partially-funded

plans is that the fully-funded plan is fully capable of meeting its future
financial obligations to beneficiaries on the basis of the contributions that
have been made to the fund by or on the behalf of the beneficiaries.

Whereas,

a partially funded plan is not capable of meeting its obligations to beneficiaries on the basis of past and current contribution levels, and hence,
will require a subsidy to pay full benefits in the future.

This subsidy is

likely to be paid by future participants of the plan, employers or employees
or both; and hence, the fulfillment of the plan agreement will require an intergenerational transfer of income, that is, between the working population and the
retired population.

16

In developing a typology of pensions, it is with funded plans (both
fully-and partially funded) that confusion is frequently encountered.

Hence,

before proceeding with the typology, several criteria will be suggested for
use in discriminating between the various forms of pensions.

These criteria

relate to the three principle elements of pensions defined previously, and
will be presented in that framework.
With respect to the administration of the plan, the primary criteria
for distinguishing between plans is the control of the plan and fund.

Inherent

in this line of inquiry are the issues of control of the plan and fund; fund
investment policies, the establishment of beneficiary eligibility requirements,
i.e. service and contributory obligations, the ability of parties to the plan
agreement to interpret the plan and rule on disputes arising over interpretation the plan agreement.

Generally, control over the fund will go to the group

in the plan who finance it or contribute to the fund.
Related to benefits are several criteria useful for distinguishing between
types of plans and for evaluating the status of the fund, that is, whether it
is fully- or partially-funded.

The first criteria related to benefit payment

to be examined is the manner in which benefits are paid by the plan., Benefits
may be paid by a plan to a retiree in a "lump-sum" benefit, or the plan may
transfer a lump-sum to an insuror on the retiree's behalf for the purchase of
an annuity.

Or finally, the plan may pay a specified benefit per unit of

time, generally a month, for the rest of the retiree's life; this type of
benefit is the most common and will be the type discussed here.
Another variable related to benefit payment by a pension plan is the
basis used by the plan adminstrator to determine the level of benefits paid
by the plan to beneficiaries.

This is also an important variable in evaluating

the financial status of the plan.

With respect to the basis for determining
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the level of benefits is the plan agreement itself.

Generally ·a flat rate, or

fixed benefit level will be specified and due to the participant upon completion
of the service and/or contributory requirement of the plan.
In plans with variable benefit levels, the level of benefits paid by
the plan is also based upon the plan agreement.

However, rather than specify

a benefit level, by establishing a benefit formula, the plan agreement will
relate the level of benefits due to retirees to one or more variables.

One

fairly simple type of variable benefit plan would be one in which the level of
benefits is based upon years of service over the minimum specified for eligibility under the plan agreement.

For example, a plan may pay a benefit of

$200 per month to retirees who have satisfied the minim.urn service requirements
of the plan, 20 years of service.

In addition, the plan may pay increased

benefits to retirees with more than the 20 years of service required for
eligibility under the plan; that is, the plan may pay an additional $10 monthly
benefits per years of service over the minimum.

Thus, a retiree with 21 years

of service may expect a monthly benefit of $210, a retiree with 22 years of
service would expect a monthly benefit of $220, etc.

Although only a partial

list, the common methods for determining variable benefit levels include
formulae which adjust benefits to a price index, industry or labor force
productivity, employee contributions, an employee's pre-retirement salary or
wage, or to an employer's profits.
Most of the criteria associated with evaluating contributions to a plan
or fund are closely related to the criteria used for evaluating benefits paid
to beneficiaries.

Likewise, these criteria are also useful for assessing the

financial status of the plan's fund; that is, whether it is fully- or partially-
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funded.

However, a primary consideration to be made with respect to contri-

butions to the plan, which is more closely related to issues of fund control
rather than financial status, is the determination of the source of contributions.

That is, which party or parties to the plan agreement contribute

to the fund?
If we were considering a plan in which the beneficiaries make contributions to the plan, the plan would be said to be a "contributory" plan.

And,

on the other hand, if beneficiaries make no contributions to the fund, the
plan would be said to be "non-contributory".

Categorizing on the basis of the

source of contributions to the plan, contributory plans are more prevalent
than the non-contributory variety.
However, in a larger sense, that is in terms of the micro-economic theory
of the distribution of income to factors of production, it may be successfully
argued that an

e~ployer's

contribution to an employee's pension fund is a labor

cost and therefore part of the employees' wage.

Thus, following this line of

reasoning, all plans are contributory, that is, the employees or beneficiaries
pay the cost of the plan either in the form of contributions to the fund or
forgone wages.
This line of reasoning finds its principle usefulness in bargaining
between the parties of the plan, and for analyzing the savings aspect of the
plan.

In the final instance, we are concerned with the rate of savings the

contributions to the plan implies and what return on investment does the plan
yield to its participants.
Using the basic elements of pensions discussed above, the first type of
funded plan which may be distinguished is the insured plan·.

Although uninsured
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plans are more common in terms of coverage, with approximately 20.4 million
12
covered participants to 9.3 million participants in insured plans ; the
latter type of plans tend to be used more frequently by small plans and retirement plans for the self-employed.

Insured plans provide an opportunity to

these groups to reduce the risks of participation in a pension plan by purchasing the financial and investment expertise of the insurance carrier.

Hence

in spite of the fact that insuring a pension plan or private savings plan
involves higher costs, for individuals or small groups lacking the necessary
skills or the resources to hire full time pension management, the insured plan
is an attractive alternative.
The major contrast of insured plans to the uninsured varieties is the
administration of the respective plans.

In the case of the insured plan, the

plan administrator, or the insurer controls the fund and its disposition in
accordance with the plan agreement, and also controls the investment of the
funds' assets absolutely.

Contributions to the insured plan are made as

premiums, which are paid entirely by the insurance purchaser at whatever rate
is required to provide the benefit level desired in retirement.

Whether the

rate of contribution is determined by a desired benefit level or the benefit
level is determined by a desired rate of contribution; the levels of contributions and benefits are based upon the length of the period of participation
in the plan, and the insurance carrier's experience ratings of such plans.
Hence, with regard to the financial status of insured plans, they are always
fully-funded.
In uninsured plans, in contrast to insured plans, administrative
responsibilities and control over the fund rest in the hands of either an
12.

U.S. SSA, Soc. Sec. Bull., April, 1972.
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employer, a group of employers, or a group of employees.

While the insurer

collects premiums, invests funds and pays benefits in the insured plan, these
responsibilities are the obligations of the participants of the plan, or
individuals appointed to undertake the responsibilities of fund administration
and management.

These individuals, called trustees, exercise control over the

fund by virtue of proxies from the participants of the plan, either the employer,
the employees or both.

Hence, the degree of control which the purchaser of

the pension has over the characteristics of the plan and over the administration
of the plan varies widely and is the primary basis upon which funded pensions
are categorized.
In the terms of the criteria suggested earlier for the evaluation of
funded pension plans, perhaps the simplest funded plan with regard to organization and control, is the "unilateral" plan.

In this type of plan, admin-

istrative responsibilities and control over the characteristics of the plan
and the disposition of the fund rests entirely with one party to the plan
agreement, and that is generally the employer.

Unilateral plans are most

commonly found in small businesses and in industries employing white-collar
occupational groups; particularly where there are no unions to bargain over
the plan.
Typically, in an employer controlled unilateral plan, the employer either
administers the plan directly or indirectly through trustees who manage the
fund.

In addition, the employer establishes contributory and service eligi-

bility requirements; rules on disputes and establishes benefit and contribution
formulae.

Therefore, an employee participants in an unilateral plan has no

control over the characteristics of the plan or its administration; decisions
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on matters such as these are entirely the perogatives of the unilateral
fund administrator.
Distinct from unilateral plans in our typology are the most widely
publicized type of plans, the "bargained" or "negotiated" plan.

There are

several popular types of bargained plans, but all are basically variations
on the funded plans discussed heretofore.

Perhaps the simplest variation

in light of the discussion above is the "employer administered bargained
plan".

Such a plan could be identical to that discussed above as a unilateral

plan with the exception that the characteristics of the plan are determined
through two-party negotiations.

The employer, in this case, would remain

responsible for the adminstration and management of the fund; although the
employer's control and interpretation of the plan would likely be subject
to the review of a bargaining unit representing the employees.
Similar to the employer administered bargained plan is the "jointly
administered bargained plan" which, as the name suggests, is a plan jointly
administered by employees and employer.

The joint administration of the plan

is arranged through one of several means, either by establishing a representative board of trustees where the trustees would be elected or appointed by
the memberships of each bargaining unit to represent their respective interests
in the fund's decision and management processes; or, the trustees could also
be elected or appointed unilaterally but subject to the review of the other
side.
Another variation on the theme of bargained plans are union adminstered
plans which are basically similar to the two other types of bargained plans
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discussed above.

The typical union adminstered plan is one in which a

single employee group bargains with a nmlti-employer group.

One such plan,

that of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) which
is bargained over with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) will be discussed in Chapter IV in some detail.
The preceding analysis has been an attempt to systematically categorize
different types of pension plans in order to compare and contrast the various
types of plans.

Diagram 1, below, summarizes the categorization of pension

plan types with regard to funding, administration and control, and the special
characteristics of the plans.

Diagram 1
Pensio,n Plans
Fully and Partially
Funded Plans

Unfunded Plans
Unilateral Plans
Bargained Plans

Insured Plans

Employer Administered Plans

Jointly Adminstered Plans

Union Administered Plans

Multi-employer
Union Adminstered
Plans
Categorization of Pension Plans

CHAPTER IV
THREE PENSION FUNDING MODELS
Thus far the apalysis of pension has been limited to the broader
institutional and organization aspects of the wide variety of financial
instruments falling under the general heading of pensions.

These discussions

have attempted to relate pensions, particularly their development and proliferation, to U.S. economic institutions.
In Chapter IV, we till turn to an analysis of the pension as a financial
instrument for providing post retirement income.

This will entail the esta-

blishment of a pension model to examine the actuarial aspects of the implementation and operation of pension funds.
One pension model has already been introduced, that being the simple
analogy of a pension fund to a sink.

Recall that water flowing into the sink

from the faucet represented benefits paid by the plan, and the volume of water
in the sink represented the assets of the fund.

While this model clearly

illustrates the principle functions of a pension plan, it does not lend itself
easily to a more rigorous quantitative measurement and analysis of pension
funding.

In short, a more effective model, which will allow a more extensive

examination of the actuarial and financial aspects of pension funding is
preferrable.
There are however, other considerations both theoretical and practical,

relevant to the problem of designing a pension model.

In addition to the
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practical considerations of the need for quantitative applications of the
model; specifications of assumptions related to the institutional setting,
organizational form and the character of the plan's participants and beneficiaries is required.
Turning to the practical issue first; based upon its prospective
applications, the plan should be designed as simply as possible, both for
the sake of clarity and to facilitate its use as a standard of comparison.
In this regard, the principle purpose of the model building exercise is to
develop and analyze a financial instrument capable of providing post-retirement income to a group of individuals or beneficiaries to be specified later.
There is no attempt at this point, to simulate any plan in particular or any
particular type of plan.

Rather, the strategy for developing the pension

model is to illustrate a general pension model which, while it is unique in
its "generalness" of design, coverage, etc., at the same time illustrates the
functions of pensions and will thus serve as a basis of comparison.
To begin the construction of such a model it is appropriate to begin
with assumptions and data related to the plan's covered participants.

This

point of departure is appropriate because it is for the purpose of maintaining
this group's post-retirement income, and at their expense that the fund has
been established and benefits actually paid.

Beyond propriety however, assump-

tions concerning the population to be covered by the plan, their age, sex,
income, the conditions of their employment and labor force turnover are the
bases upon which the plan is established and operated.

These variables are

essentially demographic in nature and hence, it is apparent that the basis
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of the pension model is a demographic model of the plan's participants.
This demographic model is developed using the Method of "potential
13
demography"
in which a survival table showing the age specific mortality
rates of an assumed or empirically determined population with specified size
and age-composition, is used to project the size and age-composition of the
population at some point in the future.
the "potential demography"

From the information obtained from

projection we can calculate how many of the plan's

participants are expected to reach the age of retirement, and, given that event,
how long retirees are expected to live and collect benefits.

Thus, the demo-

graphic model of the plan's participants, once benefit levels and eligibility
rules have been specified, is the basis for determining the liabilities the
fund will incur over time.
In their initial derivation and use, the variables of both the demographic
model and pension model will be assumed to be fixed over the projection period.
This will be done to establish, and then examine a stable population and pension
system.

Thus, the initial demographic assumptions will be used to develop a

model of a stable sized labor force with a constant age-composition.

In other

14
words, the labor force will be a "stationary population"

which Lotka has

15
demonstrated will occur given constant age-specific mortality and birth rates.
Since the stationary population concept was developed with respect to an entire
population, (i.e., containing individuals of all ages, from infancy to old age)
certain assumptions in addition to Lotka's conditions concerning birth and

13.

A. Sauvey, .££.· cit., p. 304.

14.

Ibid.,
Alfred
Paris,
Books,

15.

p. 4.
J. Lotka; Theorie Analytique des Associations Biologiques;(Hermann,
1936); English Edition: Elements of Mathematical Biology (N.Y., Basic
Inc., 1969).
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mortality rates are required to adapt the population model to a labor force
model.
First among these adaptations will be the dropping of assumptions regarding
birth rates.

For the purposes of the pension fund model we are not concerned

with births to members of the labor force, but rather, additions to the labor
force through the hiring of new members.

Therefore, the "stationary labor

force" is established with constant age-specific mortality rates and stringent
assumptions concerning labor force entry and exit.
Since our model labor force is assumed to be stable with respect to its
size and age-composition, it follows that the number of entrants in any given
year must be exactly equal to the number of withdrawals from the labor force.
If it is further assumed that there is no labor force turnover, then we may
deduce that the number of entrants per year is equal to the number of mortalities since under the assumption of no turnover, death is the only means of
withdrawing from the labor force.
Further adaptation of the "stationary population" model to a "stationary
labor force" model requires an additional assumption relating to the age of
entrants to the labor force.

Just as entrants to a stationary population have

a specified age, or at the very least, the average age of entrants at entry
should be determined and held constant over the projection period.

(Averaging

the age of entrants, as opposed to specifying a uniform age at entry interjects
an error into the "potential demography" projection because of the non-linearity
of age-specific mortality rates.

The error will vary in proportion to the

standard deviation of the age of entrants around the mean ape at entry.)

Thus,

there are two principle assumptions related to labor force entry: 1) the number
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of entrants to the labor force in any given year is equal to the number of
entrants in any other year, and further, is equal to the number of mortalities
in that, and any other year; 2) the age of entrants at the time of entry is
assumed to be twenty years of age.
In addition to the above, the lahor force is assumed to be all male,
both to avoid using two sets of age -- specific mortality rates and two
retirement

a~es

as well.

The impact of women on the pension fund model, under

normal assumptions would be to increase costs slir,htly as a result of a longer
life expectancy and an earlier retirement age.

The extent to which costs would

increase if women were covered participants in the plan is undeterminable
however.

It has not been conclusively demonstrated that women would have

significantly higher life expectancies than men under similar occupational
conditions, and thus, it may be inappropriate to follow normal assumptions
and utilize two sets of age-specific mortality rates even if
eluded in the demographic model.

wo~en

were in-

The mortality rates used in the potential

16
demography projection of the stationary labor force are for male caucasians.
The assumptions above, particularly those related to labor force entry,
the age of entrants and labor force turnover are highly restrictive in the
sense of the extreme improbability of finding a labor force such as that described.

In addition, it is highly unlikely that in the event such a labor

force were found, that the conditions set forth could be maintained over a
period of time comparable to the projection period which is to be under
consideration.

16.

Statistical Bulletin (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.; Vol. 51, August,
1970) pp. 9-11.
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With regard to the no-turnover assumption, there are arguments for and
against its inclusion in the model.

If, as we have heretofore implicitly

assumed, the stationary labor force is a single industry or employer labor
force, then the no-turnover assumption seemingly implies that the stationary
labor force is also a slave labor force.

This implication is derived from the

fact that mortality is the only means of labor force exit. However, in a
17
somewhat rare case
the no-turnover assumption has been approximated in the
real world.

This, of course, is an insufficient rationale for the inclusion

of the no-turnover assumption in a general pension model.

The only point

intended is that a non-slave labor force which exhibits virtually no labor
force turnover is an observable phenomena.
A more extensive examination of the implications of the no-turnover
assumption reveals the usefulness of the assumption in light of the prospective applications of the pension plan model.

A group of beneficiaries (not

necessarily a single industry or employer labor force) which exhibit the
behavior of never leaving the group once they enter may indicate that the
pension system is universal or fully portable.

That is, if labor force

members are not assumed to be members of the same industry labor force, but
simply members of the same population or group of beneficiaries; then individuals may be entering and exiting from various industry labor forces at any
turnover rate without affecting the size or age composition of the population
of beneficiaries.

What would be affected in this instance would be the

earnings of the covered labor forces, which would fall due to the periods of

17.

The West Coast longshore industry labor force.
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unemployment between jobs.
In spite of the lack of realism in certain aspects of the model and its
related assumptions, it nevertheless remains a useful conceptual tool.

Further-

more, this usefulness is, to a certain extent, based on the same factors
contributing to the atypicality of the model.

It is the long run stability

of the covered labor force and the pension designed for them which makes the
general model a suitable basis of comparison with less stable populations and
pensions.

And this same long run stability is the direct consequence of the

highly restrictive assumptions related to the size, the age composition, and
the entry and exit rates of the labor force.
A Demographic Model of the Stationary Labor Force
Thus far the description of the stationary labor force has proceeded
in general terms.

The foundation has been laid however, for a quantitative

illustration and investigation of the size and age composition of the labor
force.

Graph 2, "Age Composition of the Stationary Labor Force" is the first

step in this direction.

This graph is a population pyramid depicting the

relative size of each five year cohort of labor force members.

As a result

of the no-turnover assumption, the diminishing size of each successively
older cohort is solely the consequence of mortality.

It can be noted from

Graph 2 that cohort size diminishes absolutely with age, and thus, relatively
with an assumed stable sized labor force, the rate of decline in cohort size
is not constant.

Thus, the population pyramid on Graph 2 exhibits a relatively

uneven stair-step effect.

This variability does not violate the stationary

population assumptions since it merely reflects the variable rate of increase
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TABLE I
STATIONARY LABOR FORCE & COHORT SIZE

COHORT

ACTIVE

RETIRED

TOTAL

Over 85

150

150

80 - 84

240

240

75 - 79

420

420

70 - 74

480

480

65 - 69

510

510

60 - 64

650

650

55 - 59

740

740

50 - 54

830

830

45 - 49

830

830

40 - 44

830

830

35 - 39

840

840

30 - 34

870

870

25 - 29

870

870

20 - 24

870

870

Total

8,200

1,800

10,000
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in age-specific mortality rates with increasing age.
Closely associates with Graph 2 is Table 1 "Stationary Labor Force and
Cohort Size," which is derived from Graph 2 and based on an assumed labor force
membership of 10,000 individuals.

In addition to labor force and cohort size,

Table 1 differentiates between the active and retired segments of the labor
force.

Labor force members over the age of 65 are assumed to be retired;

these members with a retired work status number 1,800 or 18% of the total.
Thus, the remaining 8,200 individuals or 82% of the entire labor force membership are under 65 years of age and assumed to be working and earning an income.
These proportions, i.e. the ratio of retired to active labor force members,
are also assumed to be fixed for the

s~ationary

population as a result of

the assumptions concerning labor force entry, turnover and mortality.
Before turning to the problem of developing a pension plan to cover
the stationary labor force, the income of the group remains to be specified.
The initial assumption will be that the average annual net earnings of working
members of the stationary labor force is $10,000.

Thus, given the size of

the active work force from Table 1, the net annual earnings of the labor
force is $82 million.

Further assumptions regarding the income of the labor

force will be required for the establishment of the pension plan to cover
the stationary labor force.

In particular, the distribution of income within

the labor force with respect to age.

However, these assumptions will be

specified while developing the benefit formulae in the next section.
Financial Aspects
Pensions have been discussed as financial instruments, yet at this point
the model plan has no financial components.

Thus far, attention has been
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focused on the general demographic elements of the model.

The labor force's

size and age composition have to be specified, as well as certain behavioral
characteristics and the general institutional setting.

This brings to the

fore the next step in the pension design process; that of developing a
financial instrument capable of providing post-retirement income for members
of the hypothetical stationary labor force.

In this regard, the ultimate

goal is to define benefit and contribution forraulae consistent with the postretirement income needs of the labor force members, and their capacity to
finance the plan.
One of the first considerations to be made in this regard is on what
rate of earnings replacement constitutes an adequate post-retirement income.
This question has been dealt with widely in the literature; yet no single
standard of adequacy has, or is likely to emerge as being universally
acceptable and applicable.

The improbability of the establishment of a

single standard of adequacy is the result of numerous economic, social
psychological and idealogical factors associated with the meaning of adequate
and the context of its use.

Thus, adequacy standard have developed in the

literature as a function of the purposes they have been intended to perform.
There are however, two general patterns or strategies in the development of
retirement income adequacy tests, and both are associated with particular
types of studies and research.
One type of income adequacy standard, usually associated with poverty
studies and which are regularly produced by governmental agencies, is the
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18
budgetary standard.

These types of measures define adequacy with respect

to poverty line or some market basket of goods and services representative
of a

so~ewhat

arbitrary standard of living for a household of specified

characteristics.
The other type of adequacy standard, based on specified rates of earnings
replacements, is more often associated with theoretical studies of consumption
19
functions and forecasting.
When using an earnings replacement standard,
post-retirement income adequacy is defined relative to the worker's preretirement earnings, or more generally, an index of earnings.

Corrnnonly used

indexes of earnings are the worker's average annual income, the worker's
highest annual income or an average of the highest years, but more frequently
used as an index are the worker's earnings in the years immediately preceding
20

retirement.

Once this

earnin~s

base is established, an adequate income is

defined as a fraction of that base; generally a replacement rate between
50 and 80% is used.
One such standard that was adopted by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) in its "Statement of Principles on Academic

18.

19.

20.

BLS Bulletin 1570-6, Three Budgets for a Retired Couple in Urban Areas
of the U.S., 1967-68, which is regularly supplemented by the U.S. Department of Labor is one example, another, Three Standards of Living for an
Urban Family of Four Persons (Sp., 1967), BLS Bulletin 1570-5.
Schulz & Carrin, "The Role of Savin~s & Pension Systems in Maintaining
Living Standards in Retirement", Journal of Human Resources (Vol. VII,
No. 3, Summer 1972) p. 349; and Schulz, James, "Economics of Aging",
Chapt. IV "Research and Development Goals in Social Gerontology -- A
Report of a Special Committee of the Gerontological Society", printed as
special volume of The Gerontologist (9, Winter 1969), pp. 65-79; and
Juanita Kreps,~· cit., Chapters 8-11, are examples of research following
the earnings replacement standard method of determining post-retirement
income adequacy.
Schulz & Carrin,££.· cit., p. 349.
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21
Retirement and Insurance Plans"

specifies"that a person's benefits (be)

equivalent in purchasing power to approximately two-thirds of the yearly
disposable income realized from his salary • • • during the last few years
of full-time employment."

In addition to specifying an earnings base and

replacement rate, the AAUP in its statement of principles has defined adequacy
in real terms, i.e. "purchasing power".

Thereby incorporating the necessity

of providing means of off setting inflationary forces which diminishes purchasing
power absolutely, and economic growth, which diminishes purchasing power
relative to other (non-retired) economic groups.

These latter two consider-

ations, inflation and economic growth, may in the long run have a greater
impact of the adequacy of benefits than the replacement rate; and hence, are
important considerations in developing a long-run pension projection.
If, for example, an individual is receiving retirement benefits equal
to 75% of his pre-retirement income of $10,000 or $7,500 in benefits annually,
and the price level in the economy rises, then in real terms, the replacement
rate becomes less than 75%.

If, over this period of time, prices rise by 25%

than in real terms, the $7,500 in annual benefits represents only a 60% replacement rate.

Further price increases would deteriorate the adequacy of benefits

more in the same fashion.

Economic growth has a similar effect on benefit

adequacy, but is more closely related to the problem of maintaining an equitable
distribution of income between working and retired groups.

It is generally

assumed that the earnings of workers will reflect increases in their own
productivity, and to a lesser extent, productivity gains in allied industries
and general economic growth.

Thus, if we assume that members of the stationary

labor force increase their output per unit of other outputs, then their earnings

21.

AAUP Bulletin 55, pp. 9-69, 386-389.
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can be expected to increase relative to other groups of workers, ceterus
paribus.

However, with regard to the allied problems of maintaining benefits

at an adequate level and an equitable distribution of income within the
stationary population, the increases in the earnings of the working labor
force members improves their position relative to retired members, and
conversely, deteriorates the financial position of retired workers relative
to workers.

Furthermore, if the productivity and earnings increases are repre-

sentative of trends in the outside economy, then retirees will suffer a loss
in financial status relative to all working groups in the economy.

Hence,

these two variables have a critical and direct impact on benefit adequacy
in the long run, and need to be incorporated into the pension model projection.
This will be accomplished by means of the assumptions used in establishing
the benefit formula.

First however, as a basis for determining an adequate

level of benefits some additional assumptions regarding labor force earnings
are in order.
In the preceding section the average annual net earnings of
members of the stationary labor force was specified at $10,000.

workin~

Based upon the

size of the labor force, the net annual earnings of the entire labor force was
then calculated to be $82 million.

As a basis for establishing an adequate

level of benefits for retirees from the stationary labor force, it will be
assumed that incomes of the individual members of the stationary labor force,
range between $5,000 and $20,000 net annually, depending upon seniority and
position.

It will further be assumed that the average net annual earnings of

working labor force members who are aged 60 and over is $15,000.

This figure
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will be used as the pre-retirement earnings rate to be replaced at a fixed
proportion by the model plan.

By basing the level of benefits paid to all

retirees on the average earnings of currently working labor force members
aged 60 and older, we provide a major hedge against possible deterioration
of benefit adequacy by economic growth and/or inflation.

Retirees will thus

benefit from cost-of-living wage increases and productivity related wage
increases earned by active workers.
The pre-retirement earnings rate of replacement used in the model plan
will be 60%.

Hence, a retiree member of the stationary labor force receiving

60% of $15,000, or $9,000 is assumed to have an "adequate" post-retirement
income.

The $9,000 annual income is above the total budget costs of a "higher"

standard of living for a retired couple in the urban U.S. as reported by the
BLS for Autumn, 1972.

Thus, this retirement income is quite adequate by these

standards as well.
Thus far, the consideration of earnings and income has run in terms of
these amounts net of taxes.

Therefore, it has been implicitly assumed that

workers have been paying payroll taxes for Social Security benefits, and will
receive them upon retirement.

If the potential sources of post-retirement

income are limited to include only Social Security benefits and benefits paid
from the model plan, then the problem of determining a benefit formula becomes
one of supplementing individual's Social Security benefits to bring their total
22
income up to the level determined to be adequate.
If Social Security is assumed to provide an annual benefit of $3,600,
then the balance of the $9,000 or $5,400 must be supplemented by the model

22.

Sometimes called an "envelope" formula.

Marples, Act. Aspects, p. 30.
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plan.

Thus, we have defined the plan's benefit formula as Yb= (.6 Ye) - Yss•

Where the retirement benefit paid by the plan (Yb) is equal to 60i~ of the income
earned by workers aged 60 - 65 (Ye) less benefits received from Social Security
(Yss).

This formula, along with the demographic characteristics of the stat-

ionary labor force discussed, provide the basis for projectin3 the potential
liabilities of the plan in the future.
Although the period of projection has not been specified yet, under the
assumptions of the stationary labor force, the length of the period is of
little consequence to the computation of potential liabilities.

Since the labor

force, whether viewed as a pyramid as in Graph 2, or in absolute terms as in
Table I, will remain identical to the beginning population over a 10, 20, 30,
40 year planning period by virtue of its stationary status.

However, while it

makes no difference with regard to the demographic variables what projection
period is used, one must be specified to develop an estimation of actuarial costs
over that period.

Hence, the planning or projection period to be used will be

arbitrarily set at 40 years.

The problem projecting the liabilities of the fund

over a 40 year period becomes elementary given the life-table of the stationary population and the benefit formula of the plan.

Since we know both

the number of labor force members who will retire each year, how long
retirees are expected to live and how much they will receive in benefits in
each year of retirement, the calculation of the plan's potential liabilities
becomes rather mechanical.

Particularly when, as in this case, all of the

so-called "variables" are constants given the characteristics of the stationary
labor force.

As Table I illustrates, the demographic variables affecting the
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plan, i.e., the respective size of the worker and retired groups, are absolutely
constant with respect to time.
Graph 3, "Projected Size of Labor Force by Work Status," depicts the
results of the potential demography projection of labor force size and aP,e
composition with respect to work status.

(Chart 1 would represent the age-

composition by cohorts for both the beginning and ending of the projection
period.)

The total stationary labor force, represented by line t, has 10,000

members and includes, 8,200 active and 1,800 retired members, represented by
lines "a" and "r" respectively.
This projection of the size of both segments of the labor force is the
basis for determining the actuarial costs of the prospective plan.

Under the

conditions established, there are the same number of retirees in each and
every year of the projection, therefore the liabilities incurred by the plan
will have the same time pattern.

Hence, with 1,800 retirees collecting benefits

of $5,400 annually, the total annual liability of the plan in the first, or
any year of its operation is projected to be $9.72 million.

Graph 4, "Pro-

jected Labor Force Earnings and Pension Liabilities," illustrates the time
pattern of the plan's projected liabilities; as well as projected earnings.
These levels of earnings and liabilities have been projected on the basis
of no inflation and/or economic growth, and/or market change.

However, by

virtue of automatic benefit escalators built into the benefit formula, earnings
and liabilities are presented in real terms.

Thus, we can expect liabilities

over time to remain a constant proportion of labor force earnings.

So that in

the event earnings are escalated to maintain or raise the real income .of the
active labor force, there will be a parallel shift upwards in the liabilities
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of the plan.
The determination of the actuarial costs of the plan principally involves
detenilining the present value of the stream of future liabilities depicted on
Graph 3.

The present value of the sums-of money due to beneficiaries in each

year of the projection is the product of three factors, two of which have
already been discussed.

The first requirement is an estimate of the amount

of money to be paid, or liabilities to be incurred in each year.

This has been

specified at $5,400 per beneficiary, per year or $9.72 million per year for
the benefits for all retirees.

Secondly, an estimate of the probability of

payment, or of incurring liabilities in each year is required.

This is defined

by the life table of the stationary population.

The final variable, the
23
interest factor or discount rate has yet to be specified.
The choice of an interest or discount rate is a conceptually difficult

one and, in the end is arbitrary.

In this case however, the choice is not

particularly crucial since variations in the discount rate have no impact on
the model other than expressing a differential rate of time preference.

That

is, since the present value calculation expresses the value of a future income
stream to a beneficiary or future expenses to the plan in terms of current
income or liabilities, if two otherwise identical plans have two different
discount rates, the plan with the higher rate simply values current income
more than the plan with the lower rate.

This situation will give rise to the

plan with a higher discount rate to assign a lower present value to its

23.

Marples, Actuarial Aspects of Pension Security (Pension Research Council,

Wharton, etc.) p. 50.
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expected liabilities than the other plan, even though their expected liabilities
are assumed to be equal.
In this case, the discount rate that will be used is 5i..

Thus, the

present value of the projected liabilities of the plan, expressed in general
form as:
39

n

! ln/{l + .05) ;
0
where n represented each year of the projection period, and ln represents the
plans liabilities in each year.
Substituting $9.72 million into the above equation and expanding so
that the projected liabilities for each year may be discounted yields:
39

0

!

1

$9.72 m I (1 + .05) + $9.72 m I {l + .OS) +
0
2
0
39
$9. 72m I (1 + .05) + .
• + $9.72m I {l +.OS)
2
39

= $172

million

This:figure is the standard of the cost of the pension plan since it evaluates
the stream of future liabilities shown by line L of Graph 4 in terms of current
income or currently held assets.

Hence, it is the basis of cost comparison

among alternative benefit formulae, and is also useful in the computation of
contribution rates.
Financing the Plan
While little specific attention has yet been paid to the problem of
financing or funding the pension plan, a number of factors having influence
upon the general approach to the issue have been either specified or implied.
24
What remains is to define a funding program, that is, to define a time pattern

24.

Marples,

~·

cit., pp. 70-98.
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and rate of contribution which will provide the plan with assets with which
it may pay its liabilities.
The funding program of a plan.is described in the plan agreement itself
and establishes rules concerning the " • • • receipt, accumulation and disburse25
ment of benefit funds."
Thus, the funding program establishes the degree
of advance funding which is agreed upon by the plan's participants.

And it

is this factor which will determine the time pattern and rate of contribution
relative to that time pattern, necessary to finance the model plan.

Thus, the

problem of computing a contribution formula is entirely dependent upon the
assumptions adopted concerning the funding program.
In establishing a funding program there are an almost unlimited number
of options available, all of which would be able to provide the model plan
with assets with which to pay its liabilities.

Obviously, all of these alter-

native programs cannot be analyzed; and there would really be no need for such
analysis since the difference between each would be only marginal.

In view

of wide choice of funding program alternatives and the problematic nature of
various existing funding programs, the choice of a program should rest upon
the characteristics, needs and financial capacity of the group of beneficiaries.
Thus, rather than replicate an existing program or type of program, effort will
be made to design an adequate program of funding.

Hence, the criteria of choice

between alternative funding programs is the workability and adequacy of the
program, and not conformity to some existing standard.

While the funding

program chosen will conform to some standard or fall into a certain category

25.

Marples, ££_. cit. , p. xviii.
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of funding programs, this is only because the universe of pension plans have
all been categorized to some degree.
In this analysis, three funding programs will be presented.

Each varying

with respect to the degree of benefit security it provides, and therefore, they
will also vary in their respective contribution formulae.

These programs will

be presented in the order of the complexity, cost and security they provide,
starting with Funding Program I.
Funding Program I.

Given the projected liabilities of the model plan

shown on Graph 4 by line L, the task of designing a contribution formula may
be reduced to its absolute simplist if the plan were to fund its current liabilities only.

Or in other words, if the funding program were established as a

"pay-as-you-go" plan.

This type of funding program could provide the plan with

assets to meet its liabilities in the year of contribution.

That is, we will

match the time pattern and level of contributions to the time pattern and level
of benefits to be paid as shown on Graph 4 by line L.

Thus, the time pattern

and level of contributions would look like Line L of Graph 4, which is at a
constant annual level of $9.72 million.
At the above rate of contribution, the active members of the stationary
labor force would be forced to pay a tax, in effect, of approximately 8.4 per
cent on their real income.

This tax is in addition to payroll taxes paid by

the labor force members of OASDHI; and, at the base year price level, represents an average reduction in net annual earnings of $840 per worker.
This brings forward the question of what happens to the plan if at some
time the active workers of the stationary labor force decide not to, or refuse
to pay the tax?

At this point it can only

be presumed that the plan liabilities
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will not be paid and retirees from the labor force will lose the substantial
share of the post-sretirement income they had expected.
This possibility illustrates the major drawback of this, and other "payas-you-go" plans.

The lack of advance funding gives potential beneficiaries

little, if any, security.

Plans lacking full advance funding, of which "pay-

as-you-go" plans are an extreme case, are not surprisingly, the most susceptible

26
to failure.
Funding Plan II.

While Plan I would provide an adequate level of funding

for the model plan, the issue of the security of current and future retirees'
benefits remains problematical.

Thus, it is.useful to design another funding

program, but in this case, a funding program which will provide the beneficiaries
of the model plan with a greater degree of security.

This, in turn, will require

assumptions concerning advance funding, and in this regard there are two
issues of importance.

First, since the problem is to design a plan with advance

funding, the initial consideration should be, how far in advance should liabilities be funded?
be?"

This question could be phrased as "how big should the fund

This is easily computed, given time patterns and level of liabilities

shown on Graph 4, using the present value determination of costs.

Thus, if

we assume, for Funding Program II, that liabilities will be funded twenty years
in advance, then the required size of the fund can be calculated from the
following equation:
19
F

=

0

L1
0

I (1 + .05)

0

19

1

0

+ 1 I Cl + .05)
1

I (1 + .OS)

+ ... + 1
19

The size of the fund in the first year of the period (Fo) which is required
to meet the liabilities of the fund projected over 20 years (0-19), is equal to
those liabilities discounted by an assumed 5% annual return on the assets of the
26.

Beier, Emerson, ''Termination of Pension Plans: Eleven Years Experience",
i!onthly Labor P.eview (June, 1967). pp~ 26-30.
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of the fund.

Plugging the value of liabilities projected for years 0-19 into

the right hand side of the equation, and sununating yields $127,190,622.
Once the problem of specifying the desired degree of advance funding is
resolved, the problem of determining an appropriate contribution formula is at
hand.

Unlike the contribution formula of Funding Program I which was simply

an 8.4% tax on the net real income of active labor force members, the contribution formula of Funding Program II consists of two formulae.

That is, since

the model plan is new, there will be of necessity a period in which the fund
accumulates assets to build a fund of the desired size to cover its unfunded
liabilities from past service. What is required is the establishment of a
27
"benchmark",
or the designation of a point in time at which the fund is
designed to become fully-funded with respect to its 20 year projected liability.
If we assume that the benchmark will be 10 years from the establishment of the
fund, the next step will be to compute the necessary pre- and post-benchmark
contribution formulae.
Of immediate interest is the pre-benchmark contribution formula; which,
while it will take the form of a proportional tax on net real income, it will
also represent a higher rate of taxation than that used in Funding Program I.
This situation is required by the asset accumulation program of the plan in
addition to contributions required to meet current liabilities since the plan
is assumed to begin paying benefits in its first year of operation.

Thus, the

pre-benchmark contribution formula must contain the 8.4% tax to discharge
the plan's responsibilities to retirees, and an additional tax on earnings to
allow the fund to reach the desired level of advance funding.

27.

Marples,££.· cit. 1 p. 97.
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Before calculating the required contribution rate to finance Funding
Program II, certain assumptions concerning the management of the plan's assets
are required.

In this regard we are particularly interested in the rate of

return on investment the fund will earn up to the benchmark.

However, since

it is extremely difficult if not impossible to predict the movement of market
interest rates and yields on investments in the market even if given precise
data on investments and market conditions, a simple 5% rate of return will be
assumed.

Studies of long-run market interest rates have shown that the real

rate of return in the market, that is, the nominal rate less the rate of
28
inflation has averaged 3%.
In light of this, the 5% rate of return on the
pension plans assets may be regarded as the 3% rate of return with the implicit
assumption of a 2% average annual rate of inflation.
With this final assumption we
of a payment annuity program.

ha~e

defined three of the four variables

Given, 1) the number of contribution and

interest-earning periods, (10); 2) the desired level of funding to be attained,
($127,190,622); and 3) the rate of interest (5%); then there is only one rate
of contribution which will compound to the desired level in the allotted time.
That rate is $10,112,200 annually, which is assumed to be contributed and
deposited or invested on the last day of the year for which it is contributed,
and at the same time at which interest on funds' assets is paid.

As mentioned

above, this $10,112,200 annual contribution is required in addition to a $9.72
million annual contribution needed to discharge the current liabilities of
the plan during the pre-benchmark period.

28.

Thus, during the initial phase of

Monetary Trends (St. Louis Federal Reserve, Sept. 19, 1973). p. 12.
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TABLE II
A COMPARISON OF CONTRIBUTIONS MID
FUNDING UNDER THREE PROGPJl!·fS
Funding
Pro~ram

I

Pre-Benchmark II

Advance
Funding

Annual
Contribution

Contribution
As a ~~ of Real
Net Earninr?s
'

None

$9. 72

8.4

N.A.

19.83

20.7

3.32

4.0

12.31

8.8

1.11

1.4

Post-Benchmark II

20 years

Pre-Benchmark III

N'.A.

Post-Benchmark III

40 years

N.A. - Not Applicable
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Funding Prop,ram
or $19,832,200.

11~

the required rate of contribution is the sum of these,

This pre-benchmark contribution level is shown on Graph 6

as line C2.
The accumulation of assets in the fund of the model plan will proceed
at the rate shown on Graph 5, "Size of the Model Fund Under Three Funding
Programs", by line F2.

On this same graph, the horizontal axis would depict

the level of the fund under Funding Program I, which of course is a fund with
assets equalling zero.

Thus, Funding Program II, with full, twenty year

advance funding has a great deal more to offer members of the stationary labor
force in terms of security.

Fowever, the near prohibitive costs of the initial

ten years of Funding Program II reduces its attr·activeness enormously.
Program II would required a 20.7% tax in the pre-benchmark period.

Funding

Before

examining these costs more extensively, the post-benchmark contribution rate
has yet to be determined.
Once the desired level of funding has been accumulated by the plan, the
rate of contribution can be adjusted downward as the plan enters the postbenchmark phase of its operations.

At this point, to maintain the fund's size

while meeting its liabilities to retirees the yearly contribution required will
be equal to the difference between the plan's liabilities and the yield on
the fund's assets.

Again assuming a 5% return on investment, the annual

return on assets equalling $127,190,622 is $6,396,859.

The required rate of

contribution must therefore be $3,323,141, which will bring the plan's annual
income, from earnings and contributions to the level of projected liabilities.
This post-benchmark contribution rate is shown on Graph 6 as line c2·.
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As seen from Graph 6, this contribution rate is
that of the initial ten years of the funding program.

si~nificantly

lower than

And, in addition, it is

substantially lower than the contribution rate of Funding Program I.

In real

terms however, the post-benchmark contribution rates for Funding Programs I,
II, and III are identical.

Although the labor force need not contribute

approximately $6.4 million because of interest earned on the assets of the fund,
when these earnings are used to meet the liabilities of the plan, labor force
members are sacrificing income.

Thus, the actual level of contribution to the

pension plan in the post-benchmark period for Funding Programs II and III is
$9.72 million.

However, since the labor force members are required to impose

a tax of only 4% on their real net earnings in the post-benchmark period,
this contribution rate may
members.

~e

perceived to be less of a burden by labor force

Table 2, "A Comparison of Contributions and Funding Under Three

Funding Programs" provides a basis for comparing the three alternate plans in
terms of their contribution rates, the tax on earnings each contribution rate
implies, and the degree of advance funding.
It can be seen from Table 2 that the pre-benchmark contribution rate
of Funding Program II imposes a substantial financial burden on labor force
members relative to the other alternative funding programs.

And on this basis,

Funding Program II may be undesirable because of the prohibitive costs of
establishing the fund in the allotted ten years.

Fowever, it is clear that

Funding Program II would provide adequate coverage for plan participants, as
well as offer a great deal more security than Funding Program I.

Thus, it

would be beneficial to examine Funding Program III which has been designed to
incorporate the security of Program II with the relatively lower cost of Program I.
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FundinP, Program III.

This final funding program has been designed to

improve on Program II by; 1) increasing the degree of advance funding by
establishing a fund equal to the present discounted value of liabilities projected for forty years, and 2) reducing the cost of establishing the fund.
Hence, the required fund size, calculated as the present value of liabilities
projected for forty years is $172,114,147.

Since this fund is larger than

that designed for Funding Program II, and the objective in Program III is to
reduce contributions under the Program II levels, an adjustment in the time
allotted to build up the fund is required.

Therefore, in contrast to the ten-

year benchmark of Program II, Funding Program III

w~ll

establish its bench-

mark as shown on Graphs 4 and 5, thirty years from the beginning of the plan.
Once again we have defined three of the four variables in a payment
annuity program; and the fourth variable, the amount of payment required per
period is easily determinab1e.

Given: 1) the number of periods in which to

build the fund (30); 2) the desired amount in the fund at the end of the
periods ($172,114,147); and, 3) assuming a 5% return on investment; 4) the
required contribution per period is $2,590,570.
Because these contributions must be made in addition to contributions
to pay benefits to retirees in the pre-benchmark period, the total required
contribution to the fund in the pre-benchmark period is $12,310,570.

This

figure is the sum of the contribution required to establish forty year advance
funding ($2,590,570), and the amount required to pay benefits to retirees in
the pre-benchmark period ($9.72 million).
This contribution rate is represented on Graph 6 as line C3, and is also

shown on Table 2 as being approximately 8.8% of net labor force income.

The
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resulting accumulation of assets by the plan will proceed as shown on Graph 5
by line F3.
As with Funding Program II, the contribution rate under Program III falls
after reaching the funding benchmark.

The post-benchmark contribution rate for

Program III is calculated in the exact same manner as for Program II, and is
shovm on Table 2 in absolute terms as $1.11 million, in relative terms as 1.4%
of the labor force's net income, and on Graph 6 as line C3.
A Comparison of Three Funding Programs.

In the preceeding section three

funding programs were presented; all of which were shown to be capable of
providing members of the stationary labor force
income.

There are however,

si~nificant

wit~

an adequate post-retirement

differences in terms of the security

they provide future retirees, their costs and the distribution of the financial
burden of establishing the fund.

While some of the issues were considered

in designing the funding programs, a closer look_ is necessary for a more
thorough examination and comparison of these aspects of the funding programs.
Table 2, "A Comparison of Contributions and Funding Under Three Funding Programs",
presents some basic information on the advance funding of the respective programs, their annual costs, and the effort required by the active labor force
in terms of the percent· of their net income which they must sacrifice to finance
the plans.

This table provides a starting point for a comparative analysis of

the three funding programs.
One important criteria for comparing the alternative funding programs is
the benefit security provided by the funding program.

Funding

"pay-as-you-go" type program and thus has no advance funding.

~rogram

I is a

This factor was

noted as a drawback to implementing Funding PrograM I when it was presented,
since the "pay-as-you-go" type of plan has proven to be the most susceptible to
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failure.

In contrast, Funding Programs II and III incorporate advance funding

into their funding programs.

Funding Program II offers twenty years advance

funding and Funding Program III provides forty year advance funding at their
respective benchmarks as shown on Table 2.

This indicates that upon reaching

their benchmarks, Funding Program II will provide one hundred percent advance
funding of liabilities projected for twenty years, and Funding Program III
fully funds projected liabilities of the plan for forty years.
All other things being equal, it could be asserted that Funding Program
III is clearly preferable to the other two funding programs in terms of the
security provided to future retirees of the stationary labor force.

Unfor-

tunately in this instance, the case is not so clear since the greater degree
of security attainable through Funding Program III is not realized until
significantly later in the projection period.

As shown on Graph 5, the fund

under Funding Program III is built up at a slower rate than under Funding
Program II.

This is the result of the lower pre-benchmark contribution rate

and the longer pre-benchmark period in Funding Program III.

While Funding

Program II reaches its fully funded status by year ten of the projection
period, Funding Program III does not reach a fully funded status until year
thirty.

Furthermore, as shown on Graph 5, Funding Program III does not

reach a level of funding comparable

t~

the post-benchmark level of Funding

Program II until year twenty-six of the projection period.

Thus, the prefer-

ence of Funding Program III on the basis of the greater degree of security
offered to future retirees of the stationary labor force is a long-run consideration.

The comparison of the three fundine programs on the basis Qf the

advance funding is inconclusive.

However, we are able to say that on the basis
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of this criterion Funding Program I is clearly inferior, and that in the long
run Funding Program III is to be preferred over the other two funding programs.
A comparison of the costs of the three funding programs must necessarily
include short run, intermediate and long-run considerations.

The immediate

short run factor to be considered in this regard is the per cent of net labor
force earnings required to finance the respective plans.

In the pre-benchmark

period, Funding Program II requires an annual contribution of $19.83 million
which represents 20.7% of the labor force's net real income.

Although these

costs are reduced sharply to $3.32 million and 4% of net real labor force
earnings after ten years when the benchmark is reached, the initial costs are
likely to be prohibitive, and particularly in comparison to Funding Program
III.

In the pre-benchmark period of Funding Program III the required level

of contribution per year is $12.3 million.

In relative terms this amounts

to 8.8% of the net real earnings of the labor force; a self-imposed tax of
only 0.4% more than that required to fund Funding Program I.

Moreover, the

rate of contribution required in the pre-benchmark period of Funding Program
III is 11.9 per cent of labor force earnings less than the comparable figure
for Funding Program II.

Thus in the short run, Funding Program III imposes

substantially less of a burden on the stationary labor force.
It is useful to examine the sacrifice required as a result of undertaking either of the two funding programs in terms of family budgets.

This

analysis will show the impact of participating in the respective funding
programs on the standard of living of active labor force members.

Earlier it

was assumed that the average net income of labor force members, that is the
income available for consumption, is $10,000.

This figure is approximately

5fi

12% below the cost of total family consumption under the higher budget for
four-person urban families in 1970, and approximately 22% above the inter29
mediate budget figure for total family consumption.
If it were assumed that the stationary labor force uses Funding Program
II to finance its pension plan, then the average net real income of active
members of the labor force in the pre-benchmark period would be reduced by 20.7%,
or to $7,930.

Relative to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics budgets for

four-person urban families, using Funding Program II would reduce the real net
income of labor force members to a full 30% below the consumption costs for
the higher budget, and 3% below the consumption costs for the intermediate
budget.

Hence, it is apparent that under Funding Program II, labor force

members must take a substantial cut in their standard of living; from slightly
below the higher budget level to slightly below the intermediate budget level.
In contrast to the sacrifices required by Funding Program II, the sacrifice
required to finance Funding Program III is slight.

In the pre-benchmark period

of Funding Program III the average net income of active labor force members
would be reduced by 8.8% or from $10,000 to $9,120.

Relative to the consumption

costs for four-person urban families prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the average net income of the labor force members after contributing to Funding
Program III would be almost 20% below the consumption costs for the higher
budget, and slightly more than 11% above the consumption costs for the intermediate
budget.

Hence, it is clear in terms of the standard of living of labor force

members that Funding Program III would reduce that standard of living but

29.

USDL, BLS. Three Standards of Living for an Urban Family of Four Persons
(Bulletin 1570-5, 1972). p. 3.
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sir,nificantly less than the adoption of Funding Program II.
The respective funding programs may also be compared with respect to
their costs over time, and in this regard two time periods will be considered:
an intermediate run which is defined for this analysis as the forty year
projection period; and a long run defined as the beginning of the projection period to perpetuity.
One standard method of comparing the costs of the three funding programs
is accomplished by calculating the present discounted value of projected contributions under each funding program.

Using this criterion of comparison the

preferred funding program would be that which had the lowest present value of
projected costs.

This calculation has been made for both the intermediate

and long run periods, and the results of these computations are shown on Table
III, "Present Value of Contributions Under Three Funding Programs: Intermediate
and Long Run".
TABLE III
PRESENT VALUE OF CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER THREE
FUNDING PROGRAMS: INTERMEDIATE AND LONG RUN

Funding Program
I
Intermediate run
Long run
II
Intermediate run
Long run

Present Value
of Contributions
(Millions)

$172
204
193
207

III

Intermediate run
Long run

200
204
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As shown on the table, the greatest differences in the cost of the three
funding programs exist in the intermediate run; that is, when only the forty
year projection period is considered.

In this time frame, Funding

Pro~ram

I

has the lowest present value of projected contributions, Funding Program II has
the second lowest present value of projected contributions and Funding Program
III is the most expensive plan using this criterion.

The present value of

contributions under Funding Program I is 89 percent of the comparable figure
for Funding Program II, and 86 percent of the present value of contributions
under Funding ProEram III.
Since the model stationary labor force pension plan is designed and
assumed to be capable of providing benefits to retirees from the labor force
indefinitely, the present value of the contributions under the three funding
programs carried to perpetuity are also shown on Table III.

These costs are

identified as the long run present value of contributions, and they show little
difference between the prograns.

The present value of contributions under

Funding Programs I and III are the same in the long run and are only 1-1/2
percent less than the present value of contributions under Funding Program
II in the long run.

Thus, in comparing the cost differentials between the three

programs on the basis of the present value of contributions, little difference
was found.

Certainly the intermediate and long run cost differentials are less

significant than short run cost differentials.
A comparison based strictly on costs is inadequate in itself since it
only shows one side of the picture.

That is, the analysis above does not allow

for a comparison of the benefits received under each funding program.

Thus,

to examine the benefits received under each program relative to contributions,
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the present value of net benefits received under each funding probram have
been calculated using the formula:
n
t
PV ==
R - C I ( 1 + . 05) •
t=O t
t

!

The results of these computations are shown on Table IV, "Present Value of
Net Benefits Under Three Funding Programs: Intermediate and Long Run", which,
like Table III, shows the present value for an intermediate and a long run
period.
TA:SLE IV
PRESENT VALlJE OF NET BENEFITS UNDER THREE

FUNDING PROGRAMS: INTERMEDIATE AND LONG RUN

Fundine; Program
I
Intermediate run
Long run

Present Value of
Net Benefits
(Vi.illions)
0
0

II

Intermediate run
Long run
III
Intermediate run
Long run

-$18
0

- 25
0

As with the comparison of the present value of contributions, the greatest
differentials in discounted net benefits of the three funding programs exist
in the intermediate run.

Hithin this time frame the present value of the

net benefits from Funding Program I is O, and is greater than the net benefits
under Funding Programs II and III which are negative.

As shown on the table,

Funding Program I has the highest discounted net benefit in the intermediate
run, the discounted net benefits of Funding Program II are second, and the
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discounted net benefit of Funding Program III is the lowest.

Thus, within the

intermediate run time frame, Funding Program I is to be preferred on the basis
of the criterion of the net benefit of the funding programs.
In the long run however, this is not the case; and as with the comparison
of the present value of contributions, there is no significant difference
between the funding program in terms of the present value of net benefits.
As shown on Table 4, the present value of net benefits under all three funding
programs is zero, indicating that in the long run, benefits received under
the three funding programs are equal to contributions made under the three
funding programs.

This comparison of intermediate and long run costs and net

benefits has shown no significant differentials between the three funding
programs; particularly when long run costs and net benefits are considered.
By far the most significant cost differential between the funding programs
are found in the short run costs of implementing the respective funding programs.
An examination of post-benchmark contribution rates under the three

funding programs reveals an additional factor relevant to the comparison of the
funding programs.

In absolute terms the post-benchmark contributions rate

under Funding Program II is $3.32 million as compared to $1.11 million under
Funding Program III.

In relative terms, the post-benchmark contributions rate

of Funding Program II requires a sacrifice of net real earnings of 4% as opposed
to 1.4% under Funding Program III.

This cost differential is clearly not as

significant as the differences in the pre-benchmark contribution rates.

However,

this differential does illustrate an important long run aspect and advantage of
Funding Program III; that is, its self-financing capacity.
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It was noted earlier that although Table 2 shows differentials in the
post-benchmark contribution rates under the three funding programs under consideration, these contribution rates are actually the same.

While Funding

Programs II and III require a post-benchmark contribution rate of $3.32 million
and $1.11 million respectively and Funding Program I requires a contribution
rate of $9.72 million, the differences are solely due to interest earned on
the assets of the fund.

However, as noted earlier, earned interest applied

to the payment of benefits to retirees represents a loss of income to labor
force members.

Hence, in terms of opportunity costs the cost of all three

funding programs is the same if we include earnings from assets sacrificed
along with earnings from workers which are sacrificed.
There is however, a distinction to be made between the contribution
rate of Funding Program I and the post-benchmark contribution rates under
Funding Programs II and III.

This distinction concerns the capacity of the

respective funding programs to generate revenues and finance themselves.

While

this factor is somewhat illusionary given the analysis of opportunity costs, it
is nevertheless an important consideration and closely related to the security
of the funding programs.

Comparison of the three funding programs on the basis

of their self-financing capacities yields the same results as the previous
analysis of security.

That is, by virtue of the greater fund size and hence

greater earning power, Funding Program III is to be preferred.
The comparison of the three funding programs has thus far included consideration of the security offered by each program; short run, intermediate
and long run costs; net benefits received from each program in the intermediate

and long run; and the self-financing capacity of each program.

While none of

these criteria are conclusive with respect to showing which of the funding
programs is best suited to the needs of the stationary labor force, this
determination is possible when these criteria are considered concurrently.
The comparison of the security offered by each funding program showed
that Funding Program I is clearly inferior to the other two programs.

As a

''pay-as-you-go" program, Funding Program I provides no advance funding while
the other programs offer advance funding and hence, greater security.
Although the criteria of long run costs and net benefits showed no significant differentials between the funding programs, the comparison of short
run costs did reveal an important difference.

On

the basis of the short run

costs of implementing each program it was shown that Funding Program II is
clearly less desireable than either Funding Program III or I.
When the self-financing capacity of each program was considered it was
shown that Funding Program III incorporates a greater capacity for generating
revenues by virtue of the larger fund size under that program.

Hence, on the

basis of this criterion, Funding Program III is to be preferred.
As a final consideration the equity of the three funding programs should
be examined.

Clearly, Funding Program I is the most equitable since the same

contribution is projected for each year of the program's existence.

In contrast,

under Funding Programs II and III the relatively high pre-benchmark contribution
forces individuals working and contributing to the fund in that period of
time to bear a larger share of the burden of building up the fund than workers
in the post-benchmark period.

This is particularly true under Funding Program

II where the fund is established in a ten year period.

As discussed earlier,

pre-benchmark contribution rates under Funding Program II were prohibitively
high, and for this reason Funding Program II is the least equitable of the three
programs.
In the preceedinp, discussion it has been shown that Funding Programs I
and II are clearly inferior programs on the basis of at least one of the evaluation criteria.

Furthermore, the preferability of Funding Program III over

Funding Program II can be seen in four factors:

1) by virtue of its forty year

advance funding, Funding Program III offers participants a greater degree of
security; 2) as a consequence of a longer pre-benchmark period, a smaller
contribution before and after the benchmark is required to finance Funding
Program III; 3) interest earned on the fund is greater in Funding Program III
as a result of the larger fund size.

Hence, Funding Program III has a greater

self-financing capacity; and, 4) Funding Program III is less severe in terms
of apportioning the costs of establishing the pension plan over time.
Funding Program III is more equitable.

Thus,

CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN LABOR FORCE
SIZE ON PRIVATE PENSIONS: A CASE STUDY
In the previous chapter, three pension funding programs were developed
to provide post-retirement income to retirees from a model stationary labor
force.

The stationary labor force model was established with explicit assump-

tions regarding labor force size, age-composition, exit and entry; and implicit
assumptions concerning the market conditions affecting these variables.

When

projected over time there was no change in the size or age-composition as a
result of the assumptions establishing the model, and hence, the liabilities
incurred by the model pension plan were absolutely stable over time.
In this chapter, the three funding programs designed to provide retirement
benefits to retirees from the stationary labor force will be applied to a labor
force with certain dynamic features.

This second labor force model is constructed

on the premise that the labor force is shrinking in size largely because of
technological change, and to a lesser extent market changes in its industry.
In addition, the age-composition of the labor force is shifting so that the
median age is becoming older.

In short, it is a labor force facing decreasing

demand for its services over time.

The model labor force used will be adapted

from a demographic model of the West Coast longshore industry labor force,
members of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU).

This

labor force will be used as a case study of a declining or shrinking labor force
to examine the impact of changes in the supply and demand for labor on pension
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funding programs.
At the outset, it is fairly obvious that a labor force which is shrinking
in size and becoming older on the average, will be unable to pay a level of
benefits to its retirees equal to benefits received by retirees from the stationary labor force with a level of effort equal to that of the stationary labor
force.

It is also obvious that a pension plan designed to pay benefits to

retirees from the declining labor force would necessarily be designed with
significantly different assumptions than those used in designing the pension
model of Chapter IV.

Thus, in this sense this exercise could be described as

setting up a straw man.

However, in an attempt to examine the impact of

changes in labor force size and age-composition on the pension funding programs,
the three funding programs developed in Chapter IV will be applied to the
longshore labor force model.

Under the conditions established in Chapter IV,

the three funding programs were shown capable of providing retirement benefits
to the stationary labor force.

Thus, the inadequacy of the model funding

programs when applied to the longshore labor force will be solely the result of
changes in the supply and demand for labor in the industry.
Before turning to the application of the funding programs the factors
affecting the supply and demand for longshoremen and the labor force's response
to these factors will be discussed.

A demographic model of the longshore labor

force will then be presented, followed by the application of the model funding
programs.
Background
That technology, or the "systematic application of scientific or other
30
has had an immense impact on the
organized knowledge to practical tasks"

30.

Galbraith. The New Industrial State (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1967).
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character of the American labor force is an understatement.

And while techno-

logical change in production processes has had a variety of implications for
the labor force with respect to the size of the labor force in various sectors
of the economy, the mix of skills possessed by the members and the stability
of employment in various occupational sectors, a less well known implication
of this phenomena is the difficulty in funding a pension plan for a shrinking
labor force.
The analysis of this less well known implication of technological change
will be accomplished through the use of a case study of a labor force in an
industry which has exhibited rapid and drastic technological change in the
manner in which production is organized and conducted.

This industry is the

longshore industry and the labor force are longshorement from the West Coast
of the United States who are members of the International Longshoremen and
Warehousemen's Union (ILWU).

The following is a brief historical sketch of

the labor force, the market conditions and production techniques in the West
Coast longshore industry.
The history of longshoring on the West Coast is a colorful one, and
from the early 1800's to the present, enormous changes have occurred.

The

changes in the character of the labor force and the concomitant changes in
longshoring techniques are of principle interest here.
In early frontier days, longshoring activity provided members of the local
labor force with casual employment.

When a ship came to port to load or unload

cargo, runners were sent out calling "attention men along the shore" to recruit
a labor force.

The only requirement of these workers, who later came to he

called longshoremen, was the ability to physically carry cargo onto, or off of
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the ship.

When the ship was loaded or unloaded and ready to leave port the
31
work force was paid and disbanded.
The policies for hiring longshoremen and cargo handling did not change
appreciably during the 19th Century.

Althoup,h mechanical aides were being

slowly introduced on the waterfront, the fundamental quality of the work was
not altered and efforts to

or~anize

the lon?:shore1'1.en were ineffective until

the 1930's.
Before 1934, attempts to organize \!est Coast longshore:r:ten had all ended
in disasters such as the shooting deaths of working men and violent confrontations
between organizers and strikebreakers, police, etc., which the workers lost.
Hany tactics were used successfully by employers to restrain longshoremen from
unionizing; government restraints, hired strikebreakers, company labor unions,
as well as police and national guard assistance when needed to end strikes
effectively.

It was not until 1933, during the depth of the Great Depression

that longshoremen were able to overcome employer group opposition to unionize
and become a cohesive labor force and bargaining unit under the International
Longshoremen's Association (ILA).
From this point the character of the longshore force has changed appreciably.
Through a union controlled hiring hall, longshoring activity relied less on
casual labor and more on full-time, regularly employed union members.

Despite

several work stoppages, jurisdictional disputes (West Coast longshoremen split
with the ILA in 1937 to form the IUJU), and political fights (the rum was
expelled from the CIO for alleged collililunist activities), the longshore force
succeeded in protecting their jobs, their union and the work rules which had

31.

The IUJU Story: Three Decades of Militant Unionism (IUJU, San Francisco, 1964).
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32
evolved in practice and which they had established by contract.
The next noteworthy change in the West Coast longshore industry began
with an expansion of the industry in the Post World War II period.

With the

Korean War, Pacific coast shipping was stimulated; and within the three year
period, 1948-51, coast-wide tonnage tripled.

However, the cease-fire in Korea

and the subsequent reduction in U.S. military involvement there, along with
general economic slowdown brought an end to the West Coast shipping boom in
1952.

Dry-cargo tonnage in foreign trade dropped by 25% from 1952-53, and

continued at that low level through 1954 until it began to rise slowly in 1955.
Aside from the general lack of trade, American-flag shippers began to face
severe competition from the Japanese, the Norwegian and others after they had
recouped their war-time losses.

In spite of the general lack of activity on

the Pacific Coast waterfronts, the union continued to dispatch full eight-man
work gangs on jobs that sometimes required as few as two men to complete.

The

old waterfront work gang procedure af "four-on-four-off" eventually degenerated
into "two-on-six-off" and resulted in some bizarre and fantastic example of
33
"feather-bedding".
As a result of union malpractices, the industry wide
cost-squeeze and allegations that Pacific Coast ports were being passed by
because of their high loading and unloading costs, the Pacific Maritime
Association (PMA), the ILWU's employer group, brought pressure against the ILWU
through "Conformance and Performance" programs.

The employers sought conformance

to standardized, non-duplicative work procedure rules and greater productive
performance.

32.
33.

These programs however, ended in failure because of the unwillingness

Ibid.
Hartmen, Paul T. Collective Bargaining and Productivity, The Longshore
Mechanization Agreement, (Univ. of California, 1969). pp. 74-80.
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of local stevedores to force compliance on PMA ships while relaxing restrictions on other ships.
TABLE V
CRUDE INDEX OF AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY,
34
PACIFIC COAST LONGSHORING, 1948-1965. (1953=100)
Year

Tonnage per
Longshore Hoursa

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

95.7
105.3
94.1
100.2
106.4
100.0
94.7

a.
b.

Tonnage per
Total Hoursb

106.5
100.0
90.2
98.6
107.5

Year

Tonnage per
Total Hoursb

1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

117.5
96.3
97.7
110.2
118.2
121.4
136.1
145.7
156.5

Total coast-wide tonnage divided by longshoremen hours.
Total coast-wide tonnage divided by total longshore, clerical, and
supervisory man-hours.
Table V shows a crude index of labor productivity for the industry.

years 1953-54 and 1955 have the lowest index of productivity.

The

Over the two

year period 1956-57, tonnage on the West Coast increased substantially by
approximately 25%, while man-hours increased by only .07 of 1%; hence, the
average productivity increases during that period were a result of expanding
output where a substantial amount of excess capacity existed.

In spite of

significant increases in average productivity in the industry the PHA continued
to press the union for waterfront work-procedure reforms and the average

34.

Hartman.

~·

cit., p. 111.
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productivity decreases during the next two year period (1958-59) intensified
PMA-ILWU nep,otiations on those reforms and culminated in the signing of the
Modernization & Mechanization (M & M) Agreement on October 18, 1960.
The union gained many new benefits and additional security for its members
as a result of the signing of the M & M Agreement; a guaranteed income, no
layoffs, easier, cleaner, safer work, early retirement and increased retirement
funds.

The enployer group, the Pacific Maritime Association was to create a

fund in order to provide these benefits.

The employers on the waterfront

were then able to mechanize waterfront activities and gradually reduce the
work force as automation and mechanization reduced needed employees.

The ILWU,

in a pamphlet explaining the contract, stated that workers who smashed machines
in the past " • • • were not trying to hold up progress, (but) were hitting back
at a system which denied them any benefits from the new machines and from
35
Progress."
A Demographic Model of the Longshore Labor Force
Based on the discussion of pension funding in Chapter III and the short
history of the longshore industry above, this section will draw these concepts
together and examine the feasibility of providing post-retirement income to the
longshore labor force with the funding models presented in Chapter III.

However,

since the funding programs of Chapter III were designed to cover a stationary
labor force and the longshore labor force is obviously a shrinking labor force,
there is little question about the feasibility of the three funding programs.
That is, these funding programs will prove to be inadequate.

35.

Yet, in spite of

Information and Union Comment on the 1960 Mechanization and Modernization
Agreement (ILWU, San Francisco, 1960), p. 3.
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this inadequacy, by promoting compatibility between the assumptions of the
demographic models of the longshore and stationary labor forces, with the
specific exceptions of the age-composition and labor force entry assumptions,
the performance of the funding programs can be simulated and examined to
determine the impact of these alternative assumptions.
Graph 7, "Age Composition of the Longshore Labor Force, 1964" shows the
relative age distribution of active longshoremen, ship clerks and walking bosses
among age cohorts shortly after the M & M Agreement went into effect.

A quick

comparison of Graph 7 with Graph 2, "Age Composition of the Stationary Labor
Force", illustrates the substantial differences in the age compositions of
the two labor forces.

In the case of the stationary labor force, the age

composition shown on Graph 2 was determined by the age specific mortality rates
of the population given constant rates of cohort entry.

The age composition

of the longshore labor force on the other hand, is the result of the actual
patterns of hiring and hiring in the industry and the age of longshoremen at
entry.

Thus, a close examination of the age structure of the longshore labor

force in light of the preceeding discussion of industry growth and productivity
changes will therefore provide a basis for inferences concerning the relationship between labor force size, age composition and productivity in the longshore industry.
The age composition of the longshore labor force as shown on Graph 7 is
the result of a variety of factors, and as we shall see, represents a problem
of inordinate magnitude for the labor force members.

As Hartman notes, the age

structure problems of West Coast longshoremen has as its root the situation

36
caused by World War II and the immediate post-war period.

Moreover, because

Graph 7 represents active survivors in 1964 and not initial entrants, the
36.

Hartman. ££_.cit., p. 166.
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AGE
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I
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PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE
I

Graph 7
Age-Composition of the Longshore Labor Force, 1964

Source: Hartman, £E.· cit., p. 166.
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magnitude of wartime expansion is understated by Graph 7.
In addition to the rapid influx of workers into the industry, another
chanee occurred in the early 1940's which also contributed to the top heaviness
of the longshore work force's age structure.

Because men with longshoring

experience were given preference in hiring in the lg40's, and also because
of the general lack of younger men in the civilian labor force during the war,
entrants to the longshore work force during that period tended to be middleaged.

Hartman reports that the median age of entrants to the longshore labor

force increased significantly over the period fron 1935 to 1945.

The age of

workers entering the longshore work force increased from a median of 29 years
in the period 1935-39, to a median of 35 years at entry in the succeedin~ five
37
Thus, the combined effect of these two phenomena occurring
year span.
simultaneously in the early 1940's explains the disproportionate size of the
cohort of workers age 50-59 on Graph 7.

This cohort represents slightly more

than 30% of the entire longshore work force, and on the basis of the data above
it can be said to be comprised of two principle groups of workers; men who entered
the loneshore work force in the early 1930's, and in all likelihood were part
of the original longshore registration with the IUTU in 1935, and men who entered
the work force in the early 1940's at an older age.
In the immediate post-war period, 1945-49, entry into the longshore labor
force was restricted somewhat, but picked up again slowly in the following decade.
Table VI, "Entry Into the Longshore Labor Force, 1935-64," shows entry into
the longshore work force by quintennial periods, and illustrates the rapid
increase in the size of the work force in the 1940-44 period and the decrease

37.

Hartman, .£E_.cit., p. 167.
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TABLE VI
ENTRY INTO THE LONGSHORE LABOR FORCE, 1935-64

Period

Entry

~fedian

Age of Entrants

1935-39

790

29

1940-44

3,278

35

1945-49

1,930

35

1950-54

2,397

35

1955-59

2,931

32

1960-64

1,923

28

Source: Hartman, .£E..· cit., p. 166 ff
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in entry in the post-war period.
Table 7, "Size and Age Composition of the Model Longshore Labor Force''
shows the size of the model longshore labor force, and its component age
cohort groups which is shown on Graph 7 in relative terms.

Excluded from this

table are longshoremen who were retired in 1964.

While the actual size of
38
the active longshore work force in 1964 was approximately 15,500 members,
the size of the model labor force has been scaled down to 10,000 members, or
to the size of the model of the stationary labor force.

Thus the demographic

model of the longshore labor force differs from the stationary labor force
only with respect to its age composition and the assumption concerning labor
force entry discussed below.
Given the size and age composition of the longshore labor force, we
are prepared to project the population through time once assumptions concerning
labor force entry and turnover have been specified.

It has been noted that the

size, age composition, entry and turnover assumptions, used in projecting
stationary labor force and the projection that population through time, were
established at sizes and rates which would allow for the maintenance of these
variables as constants over the projection period.

Thus, establishing a demo-

graphic model which exhibited stable size and age composition, and leading to
the design of a pension plan with stable liabilities over the projection period.
In designing the model of the longshore labor force however, additional criteria
were used to establish these assumptions.
In the case of the model longshore labor force these assumptions are based
in part on actual data from the industry, and in part on the desire to promote

38.

Hartman • .£.E.· cit., p. 166.
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TABLE VII
SIZE OF MODEL LONGSHORE LABOR
FORCE BY AGE COHORTS

AGE

COHORT SIZE

65-69

700

60-64

77()

55-59

1,625

50-54

1,505

45-49

1,423

40-44

1,123

35-39

928

30-34

804

25-29

568

20-24

554

Total

10,000

Active

9,300

Retired

700

Source: Extrapolated from Hartman, ££_.cit., p. 282.
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compatibility between the two model labor forces and pensions.

The assump-

tions of the longshore labor force model which are related to the age composition fall into the first group, as do, to some extent, the assumptions concerning
labor force entry and turnover.

That is, the demographic model of the longshore

labor force shown on Graph 7 and Table 7 shows the influence of turnover and
entry in the industry prior to 1964.

Hence, all that remains is to establish

turnover and entry assumptions for the projection period (post-1964) which are
consistent with expected trends in the industry.
The history of entry into the longshore labor force has been discussed
in some detail earlier, and it has been shown that entry has fluctuated widely
in response to a number of exogenous factors such as l-!orld War II, the Korean
Conflict, entry of new foreign competition into the market, and major business
cycles.

Events such as these are uncertainties, which are distinguished from

risks in that the former cannot be
tations.

p~edicted

on the basis of statistical compu-

Thus, in spite of the possibility of the occurrence of similar events

in the future, neither the events themselves nor their impact on entry can be
reasonably predicted if exogenous factors are assumed to have as much influence
on entry in the future as they have shown in the past.

The alternate assumption

of course, is that labor force entry will not be affected by economic uncertainties as it has in the past; and on the basis of recent trends in the
industry this assumption has considerable merit.
It may be argued that the combination of a number of factors; the signing
of the M & M Agreement in 1960, subsequent innovations in work procedures, the
introduction of more and better capital equipment, an upturn in the economy
in the early 1960's, and steady demand for West Coast shipping and longshoring
services resulting from the war in Southeast Asia, have in short, provided an
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ideal environment for the technological transformation of the industry.
Containerization and bulk handling of dry goods are obvious examples of this
trend.

Thus on the basis of the quality of the changes occuring in the

industry, i.e., the increasing use of capital relative to labor inputs, it is
reasonable to expect increases in the capacity of the industry to be accomplished
primarily by additions to capital equipment and the redistribution of labor
among tasks.

It may therefore be hypothesized that even in the event of the

occurrence of uncertainties of the type and magnitude of those discussed above,
labor force entry is likely to be largely unaffected.
The validity of this hypothesis is dependent upon the extent to which
innovations in production techniques have enabled the industry to respond to
future changes in demand and increase output.without increasing manhours or
labor usage.

This seems quite plausible in light of historical evidence of

excess capcity in the industry in the mid-1950's, as well as the technological
changes mentioned.

Thus, on the basis of the industry's need for labor inputs

it si highly improbable that the longshore labor force will experience any
increase in entry, ceterus paribus or even in the event of the occurrence of
major economic uncertainties.
This however, does not imply that a no-entry assumption would be more
appropriate.

On the contrary, given the changes occuring in the industry it

is probable that additions to the longshore labor force may continue to be
necessary.

Since changes in production processes are likely to introduce

demand for specialized labor skills not found in the present mix of skills in
the longshore work force, it is equally likely that there will be a need for
hiring planners, managers, technicians and equipment operators to increase or
perhaps even maintain performance.

Thus, because of the introduction of more
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sophisticated capital equipment in the industry new labor skill will be required,
and therefore either entry or retraining of workers will be necessary.
While entry into the longshore work force may be expected to continue,
on the basis of the evidence above it does not appear likely entry will
continue at a rate comparable to that experienced prior to the signing of the
M & M Agreement.

Furthermore, because of increasingly specialized nature of

the skills of labor force entrants over gime, as these skills join the work
force they will presumably decrease the required labor input for a given level
of output, through greater utilization of existing and new capital equipment,
and by achieving greater output.

In short, since it is assumed that the work

force will become more specialized and therefore increase the capital/labor
input ratio in the industry over time, the need for entrants may also be
expected to decline.

Therefore, while entry into the longshore work force

may be expected to continue, it is also likely that the rate of entry will
diminish over time.
For the purposes of formulating entry assumptions to use in projecting
the longshore labor force's size and age composition over a forty year period
the analysis above will be followed.

More specifically, it will be assumed

that in the initial year of the projection period there are 100 entrants into
the work force.

It is further assumed that in each succeeding year, the number

of entrants will decrease by 2; so that entry could range from the initial high
of 100 entrants per year to 20 entrants per year at the end of the projection
period.
The actual historical data on the age of entrants into the longshore work
force is shm.m on Table 6, "Entry Into the Longshore Labor Force, 1935-64."
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This table reveals the increase in the median age of entrants
1940's, and which was noted earlier.

durin~

the

Also to be seen on the table and not

mentioned earlier is the decline in the median age of entrants beginning in
the second half of the 1950's.
In contrast to the actual experience of the industry, for the projection
period it will be assumed, as it was with the projection of the stationary
labor force, that entrants are

~ge

20 in the year of labor force entry.

To the

extent that it is likely to understate the age of actual entrants, this
assumption will overrepresent younger cohorts in the projected age composition
of the labor force.
Given the age composition of the longshore force and assumptions concerning labor force entry, all that is required to begin the projection are
assumptions concerning the two means of labor force exit; mortality and turnover.
In the case of mortality, the same age-specific mortality rates as those used
in the stationary labor force projection will be used for the longshore labor
force members.

There are undoubtedly some differences in the actual longshore

age-specific mortality rates from those which will be used, which represent
39
national average age-specific mortality rates.
Nevertheless, and in spite
of the fact that longshoring activity can often require difficult manual labor,
the national average age-specific mortality rates will be used since the
mortality rates for longshoremen are not available.
As for assumptions pertaining to labor force turnover to be used in the
projection, an assumption of no turnover will be both compatible with the
stationary labor force model and realistic.

39.

Statistical Bulletin, .£E.· cit.

On the basis of the package of
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welfare benefits gained by longshoreMen as a result of the
~-1 &

si~ning

of the

M Agreement, the rather lax requirements for maintaining membership and

eligibility rights, the existence of a guaranteed minimum wage in spite of
actual hours worked, and the advanced age of the labor force members it is
highly unlikely that a longshoreman would quit, and it is even more unlikely
that he would be fired.

Hence, longshoremen enjoy a high degree of job

security and under current arrangements at least, labor force turnover is
40
improbable.
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that if turnover occurs in the
labor force, it is likely to have an insignificant effect on the size and age
composition of the longshore work force in the foreseeable future.

It is also

reasonable to expect that vhatever turnover will occur will involve younger
workers, and thus, will

the trends in the lahor force which increase

au~ment

the age of the labor force over time.
Pith the age composition of the labor force shmm on t;raph 7 and Tahle VI,
and assumptions

re~arding

entry, Mortality and turnover, we are prepared to

project the future size and
demography nethod.

a~e

composition of the labor force by the potential

The projection period will be forty years, and correspond

to the period from 1964 to 2004.

To compare the beginning and ending labor

force sizes and age composition refer to Graph 7 an<l Table VII, which represent
the labor force at the beginning of the period, and Graph 8 and Table VIII,
representing the labor force at the end of the period.
Looking at the latter set of Graphs and Tables, the results of the
projection can be summarized.

40.

In·terms of absolute size, the labor force

In addition, in an interview which was conducted with Al Owen, past Pres.,
Local 8 of the IUW in 1972, it was Hr. Ot-;ren' s assessment that turnover in
the longshore work force had been negligible since the signinf of H & M
Agreement.
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AGE
90 .+
85-89
80-34
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-/f9
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
5

Graph 8
Age Composition of the Lon?shore
Labor Force: End of Projection Period

10~~
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TABLE VIII
SIZE OF LONGSHORE LABOR FORCE P.Y AGE COHORTS
AND LABOR FORCE STATUS: END OF PROJECTION PERIOD
AGE
90 & over

SIZE

% OF TOTAL

187

3.98

85

162

3.44

80

229

4.87

75

326

6.93

70

390

8.29

65

468

9.95

60

464

9.87

55

442

9.40

50

410

f:).72

45

377

8.02

40

338

7.19

35

293

6.23

30

252

5.36

25

207

4.40

20

158

3.36

Active

2,941

62.53

Retired

1,762

37.47

Total

4,703

100.00
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Retired
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Graph 9
Projected Size of the Active and Retired
Components of the Longshore Labor Force

50 years
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shrank considerably, declininp, 53% from 10,000 members to 4,703 members at
the end of the period.

Of the 10,000 members at the beginning of the projection

period, 9,300 were active and 700 retired (assuming a retirement age of 65).
A comparison of these figures with similar ones from the end of period labor
force yields a clear picture of the change in the age composition which occurred
over time.

Of the actual 4,703 labor force members at the end of the projection

period, 2,941 are active and 1,762 are retired.

Thus, in relative terms, the

labor force goes from a situation in which 93% of the longshore labor force
are active, to one in which 63% are active and 37% are retired.

Graph 9,

"Projected Size of the Active and Retired Components of the Longshore Labor
Force" depicts the change in the absolute and relative size of the model labor
force over the projection period.
Because of the decline in the size of the active labor force, the funding
programs designed for the stationary labor force will obviously be inadequate.
Before turning to the model longshore pension plans however, assumptions regarding
the earnings of the active labor force must be considered.

As with certain

assumptions used in the labor force model, the earnings assumptions used for the
pension model are designed to be compatible with those used in the stationary
labor force and pension models.

Thus, it will simply be assumed that the net

real earnings of the active longshore labor force averages $10,000 per year per
member.
Using this assumption and the labor force projection shown on Graph 9, we
may construct Graph 10, "Projected Earnings of the Model Longshore Labor Force."
This Graph plots the total net real earnings of the model labor force over the
forty year projection period.

The net earnings shown on Graph 10 are based on
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Projected Net Earnings of the
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the assumed average income of active labor force members and the number of
labor force members under age 65 in each year of the projection period.

As

seen on the graph, projected net real earnings decline from an initial high
of $93 million to a low of $29.4 million at the end of the projection period.
Model Longshore Pension Plans
Before turning to the problem of applying the three funding programs
developed in Chapter III to the model longshore labor force, a number of
observations on the labor force and pension projections are in order.
The results of the projections are tentative and based on assumptions
which range from reasonable to questionable.
that the projection is probably wrong.

Thus, it could be correctly said

The validity of the model however, is

aside from the central purpose of this exercise.

The problem at hand is that

of covering a shrinking labor force with a secure pension system.

The long-

shore work force was chosen only as a model of a shrinking labor force, and it
is useful only to the extent that it exhibits certain characteristics.

The

acuity of the model in projecting the actual size and age coMposition of the
longshore work force is of secondary importance.
The purpose of the exercise is to examine the implicatians of economic
growth and technological development on the viability of private pensions.
By utilizing the longshore model it is possible to compare the performance
of the longshore pension models with the stationary labor force pension models.
Since these two labor force models differ only with respect to their age
composition and entry assumptions, and these in turn, have been attributed
to the patterns of growth and technological change in the industry, the differential performance of the pension programs may be interpreted to be solely
the result of the patterns of growth and change in the industry.
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The next step in this comparative analysis is to establish benefit levels
for the pension plan by which the liabilities of the pension plan may be projected.

As with the assumptions concerning labor force income, benefit levels

used in the longshore pension model will be those utilized in the stationary
population model.

Hence, it will be assumed the retired longshoremen receive

a pension benefit of $5,400 annually or $450 per month in real terms.

As in

the case of the pension benefits received by retired members of the stationary
labor force, the longshore pension benefits are assumed to be adjusted in
accordance with changes in the income of active labor force members.
Using the above assumption and the labor force projection depicted on
Graph 9, Graph 11, "Projected Liabilities of the Model Longshore Pension Plan,"
may be constructed.

The procedure for deriving Graph 11 is parallel to that

used in producing Graph 10.

The line on Graph 11 plots the product of the

number of longshoremen over the age of 65 and the level of real benefits paid
by the plan to retirees.

As seen on the Graph, the projected real liabilities

of the model longshore pension plan arises from an initial level of $3.78
Million to a high of $15.276 million in year 21 of the projected period; and
then declines steadily to $9.51 million in year 39, or at the end of the
projection period.
A quick comparison of Graphs 4 and 11 will illustrate the significant
difference in the level and time pattern of liabilities incurred by the
stationary labor force and longshore model pension plans.

With respect to the

level of liabilities incurred under each plan, the stationary labor force model
plan begins with a higher level of liabilities ($9.72 million as opposed to
$3.78 million).

However, by the seventh year of the projection period, the
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liabilities accruing to the longshore model plan surpass those accruing to the
stationary labor force's model plan, which of course, are constant over the
projection period.

From the seventh year of the projection period to the last

year of the period, liabilities under the model longshore plan are higher
than those under the stationary labor force model plan.

Thus, as it is expected,

the longshore plan will have a higher actuarial cost than the stationary
plan.

Using a five percent rate of discount, the present discounted value of

the stream of liabilities depicted on Graph 11 is $192.19 million, which is
approximately $20 million more than the discounted value of liabilities under
the stationary model plan.
We are now prepared to assess the three funding programs discussed in
Chapter III with respect to their capacity for providing adequate financing for
the model longshore plan.

Because, as it is noted above, the model longshore

plan is more expensive than the model stationary pension plan, the longshore
plan will obviously require greater effort on the part of the active longshoremen if adequate funding is to be realized.

Thus, it may be said from the outset

that if the contribution rates used to finance the stationary plan are followed
in the model longshore plan, the latter plan will be insolvent.

Hence, there

is no point to asking if these contribution formulae will adequately fund the
plan.

Rather, the problem has resolved itself to examining the degree of

contribution formulae inadequacy, and the effort that will be required to
finance the longshore plan.
To depict the results of using the three funding programs to finance
the longshore plan, and address the issues raised above, Funding Programs
and III will be presented first.

II

Funding Program I will then be applied and
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subsequently lead to a discussion of the issues of the degree of funding
inadequacy and the effort required to finance the plan.
Funding Program II.

Table 2, "A Comparison of Contribution and Funding

Under Three Programs" shows the contribution rates as a percent of net real
income for each funding program.

For the purposes of this analysis the contri-

butions to the model longshore fund will be calculated as a constant percent
of projected net real labor force earnings.

Thus, in the pre-benchmark period,

contributions to the longshore fund will be 20.7% of net real labor force
earnings; and in the post-benchmark period (years 10 through 39) contributions
will be 4% of projected real net labor force earnings.

Hence, under Funding

Program II, in the first year of the projection period contributions to the fund
will amount of $19.25 million, or 20.7% of $93 million in labor force earnings.
In year ten, or the first year of the post-benchmark period, contributions
will be approximately $2.9 million, or 4% of net real earnings which are projected to be $72.59 million.
Graph 12, "Projected Contributions and Fund Size under Funding Program
II: Longshore Hodel," depicts the operation of Funding Program II with the
model longshore labor force.

As it can be seen from Graph 12, contributions

(line C) decline in both the pre- and post-benchmark periods.
result of the declining labor force earnings shown-on Graph 10.

This is the
Projected

fund size, line F on Graph 12, is the summated difference between conributions
and liabilities in each year of the projection period, plus interest (calculated at 5% as in the stationary pension plan models) earned on the fund's
assets in each year.
During years 0-9 of the projection, or the pre-benchmark period, the
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Projected Contributions (C) and Fund Size (F) Under Funding
Program II: Longshore Model
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size of the fund increases rapidly from the initial level of zero, to
approximately $131 million.

Beginnin~

with year ten, the fund begins to be

depleted rapidly as a result of the significantly lower rate of contributions
shown on the graph, and rising liabilities shown on Graph 11.

By the begin-

ning of year 27 of the projection period, the fund has been completely exhausted
and shows slight negative balance.

It is important to note that with respect

to the operation of Funding Program II usin3 the longshore labor force model,
the longshore labor force expends the same relative effort as the stationary
labor force under Funding Program II.

Obviously, greater relative effort is

required if the longshore labor force model is to maintain their pension fund's
solvency.

Given the age structure of the longshore worl: force and the projected

level of liabilities, the contributions to the plan in the post-benchmark
period must increase over the 4% of net real earnings used in the model.
Funding

Pro~ram

III.

In the earlier discussion of Funding Program III,

it was noted that with respect to the stationary labor force model, Funding
Program III was superior to either of the two alternative model funding programs.
In the case of the longshore work force pension model, however, this is decidely
not the case.

This may be seen from Graph 13, "Projected Contributions (C) and

Fund Size (F) under Funding Program III: Longshore '.fodel," which has been constructed in a manner parallel to the methods used for Graph 12.
Going back to Table II, "A Comparison of Contributions and Funding Under
Three Programs," we see that in the pre-benchmark period, years 0-29 of the
projection, contributions amount to
III.

8.8~

of real net income under Fundinp,

Pro~ram

Using this rate of contribution and the projected labor force earnings

fron Graph 10, we may plot line C of Graph 13.

As with contributions under
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Funding Program II, under Funding Program III contributions decline over the
projection period because the projected level of total labor force earnings
also decline.
Line F on Graph 13, representative of the size of the model longshore
pension fund under Funding Program III, is the summated difference between
projected liabilities and contributions.

Contributions decline and liabilities

increase over the projection period; hence, as it was the case with Funding
Program II, using Funding Program III the longshore model pension fund is unable
to remain solvent.

As shown on Graph 13 by line F, the model longshore fund

accumulates funds at a decreasing rate until year five of the projection period.
During the succeeding four years of the period, the fund is depleted at an
increasing rate until year ten, the last year shown on Graph 13, at which time
the fund shows a deficit of approximately $1.8 million.
Under Funding Program III the model fund becomes insolvent much earlier
in the projection period than was the case under Funding Program II.

This fact

is the result of the significantly lower pre-benchmark contribution rate, which
in turn is the result of a much longer pre-benchmark period.

The rates of

contribution as a percent of real net income under Funding Programs II and III
in the pre-benchmark periods are 20.7% and 8.8% respectively.

The length of

the pre-benchmark period in the respective plans are ten years for Funding
Program II and 30 years under Funding Program III.

Thus, while neither

funding program discussed with respect to the lonp,shore labor force model has
proven to be adequate, it may be said that FundinR Program II is less inadequate.
The initial high rate of contributions under Funding Program
with the needs of the longshore labor force.

II

is more in line

However, an increase in the rate

of contributions in the post-benchmark period under Funding Program II, if it
were of sufficient magnitude, would provide the lonr,shore pension model with
adequate funding.
Funding Program I.

In the previous discussion and application of

Fundin~

Pror,ram I, a constant 8.4% of real net income was found to be necessary to adequately fund the stationary labor force pension model.

The invariability of

the rate of contributions under Funding Program I, which is the unfunded or
"pay-as-you-go" model, was in that case solely the result of the assumptions
establishing the stationary labor force model.

Hence, given the assumptions

underlying the longshore labor force model, it is obvious that the contribution
rate in the model longshore plan will not be constant.

As a result of

the combined effects of diminishing labor force size and earnings, and the
increase in the proportion of labor force meMbers who are retired, the required
rate of contribution will rise over most of the projection period.
Since Funding Program I is a "pay-as-you-go" plan, contributions in any
given year of the plan's operations will be equal to the plan's liabilities.
Thus, the annual contributions required to fund the model longshore pension
plan under Funding Program I are represented by Line L on

~raph 11~

"Projected

Liabilities of the Model Longshore Pension Plan".
As it can be seen from Graph 11, contributions would rise from an
initial level of approximately $3.8 million, approximately $15.3 million in
year 21 of the projection period.

During the balance of the projection

period, contributions would decrease steadily to $9.5 million in year 39.
Unlike the relatively stable levels of contributions under Funding Programs
II and III, the level of contribution increases over four-fold in the first
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half of the projection period, to decrease by 38% in the second half.
While the plan becomes less expensive to operate in the latter half of
the projection period in an absolute sense, with respect to the longshore
labor force's projected earnings, the plan will actually require a greater
proportion of earnings in the second half of the projection period.

Line LIE

on Graph 14, "Contribution Rates Under Funding Progralll I: Longshore Model,"
represents the ratio of projected liabilities to projected net real labor
force earnings, from Graphs 11 and 10 respectively.

The liabilities/ earnings

ratio increases from slightly over 4% initially to 27% in year 19.

In the

second half of the projection period, the liabilities/earnings ratio increases
to 32% by year 27, to 32.4% in year 33 at its highest, and then fluctuates
between those levels for the balance of the period.

Thus, Funding Program I

becomes more expensive, in terms of a percent of real net labor force earnings,
as we move farther into the future.

The average annual required rate of contri-

bution in the second half of the projection period (years 20-39) is 31.7% as
opposed to 15.8% in the first half of the period.
When applied to the model longshore work force, Funding Program I gives
the clearest indication of the impact of the age-composition and entry assumptions used in constructing the model longshore labor force.

Whereas in the

stationary labor force pension model the required rate of contribution was 8.4%
of net real labor force earnings per year, when applied to the longshore labor
force model, Funding Program I would require an average annual rate of contribution of 23.5% of real net labor force earnings.

Thus, the impact of the age-

composition and entry assumptions on the cost of the plan relative to labor force
earnings is clear.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In the preceeding chapter a basis for assessing the effectiveness of
private pensions in a dynamic market system has been established.

This has been

accomplished through a comparison of the operations of three model funding
programs when applied to a stationary labor force model and a declining labor
force model.
chapter.

The results of this exercise are presented in the previous

In Chapter VI, these results will be summarized and lead to a dis-

cussion of a central weakness of private pension programs in the context of
post-retirement income maintenance systems.
The first chapter presents an introduction to the problem under analysis.
The second chapter is concerned with the development of demand for post-retirment
income maintenance programs.

The retirement phenomena is discussed along with

its economic impact and implications for the retiree.

In addition, the means

of providing post-retirement income available to individuals were addressed
briefly.

It was observed that to obtain an adequate level of retirement

income, the individual must take the initiative and save in anticipation of
retirement, and/or participate in an insurance program, and/or participate in
a pension plan.
In Chapter III definitions for the basic elements of pension plans are
provided along

~.nth

some criteria for categorizing and evaluating pensions.

It was shown that while the pension is a relatively simple mechanism, wide
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differences among plans have developed as the pension has come to be utilized
increasingly.
In Chapter IV, the focus of the discussion was shifted from the demand for,
and applications of pensions in our market economy, to the construction of a
model pension plan.

The model plan was designed to provide an adequate level

of retirement income benefits to retirees of a model stationary labor force.
In developing the pension plan and funding programs for the stationary labor
force, model demographic and Market factors having potential impact on the
assumptions used inthe projection of the labor force were assumed to be constant.
The results of this assumption, as shown in Chapter IV, is an absolutely stable
pension system with respect to the level and time pattern of liabilities incurred or benefits paid.
!!arket conditions were assumed to be constant for the construction of
the demographic model of the stationary labor force, its pension plan and funding
programs; however, in the fifth chapter changing market conditions are the
basis of the discussion.

In that chapter a demographic model of a declining

labor force based on a case study of the West Coast longshore industry work
force was presented.

In constructing the longshore labor force model, assump-

tions concerning rates of labor force entry, exit and turnover, as well as the
age-composition of the labor force were based on the experience of the work
force.

Other characteristics of the longshore labor force model were established

to promote comparability between the longshore and stationary labor force models;
the labor forces were assumed to have the same earninr,s and total size.
The pension plan and funding programs were developed for the stationary
labor force model and subsequently applied to the longshore labor force model
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to compare the ability of the two labor forces to finance the model pension
plan.

Two of the funding programs developed for the stationary labor force,

Funding Programs II and III, were found to be totally unworkable for the
longshore labor force model.

Funding Program I, the "pay-as-you-go" type

program, proved to be workable, however, it was shown that the cost of implementing Funding Program I was prohibitive.

The cost of implementing the "pay-

as-you-go" program was projected to be approximately one third of projected
net real labor force earnings in the second half of the forty year projection
period.

This is compared to a projected cost of less than one tenth of net

real labor force earnings under Funding Program I when applied to the stationary labor force model.

Since the difference in the labor force models are

known, it follows that the discrepancies in the operations of the fundine
programs in their respective applications is the sole result of changes in
market conditions affecting the demand for labor in the longshore industry.
In presenting the longshore labor force model in Chapter V, two observations were made at the outset.

First, because the pension plan and funding

programs were designed to cover a stationary labor force, and the longshore
labor force is declining, the funding programs would prove to be inadequate.
This observation was verified by the exercise in Chapter V.

Secondly, it was

noted that if a pension plan and funding program were to be designed to cover
the declining longshore labor force it would necessarily incorporate different
assumptions than those used in designing the funding programs for the stationary labor force.

While this statement is true on its face, to design a pension

for the longshore labor force with the proper assumptions assumes that the
market conditions affecting the industry are either known or can be predicted
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with accuracy for a forty year projection period.
In constructing the longshore labor force model a number of factors
affecting the demand for longshoremen were discussed.

However, these discussions

were post facto analysis of the demand for longshoremen, and it was noted that
factors such as technological innovations, wars, entry of foreign.competitors
into the market, and general economic instability are generally unpredictable.
The point may then be made that the demand for labor is also unpredictable.
Therefore, any assumptions used to design a pension plan and funding

progra~

are suspect.
This brings the vulnerability of private pension plans clearly into focus.
Because the participants in a given pension plan are either employees of the
same firm, or in the same industry, conditions in the market affecting either
their firm or industry affect all of the plan's participants.

Thus, risks

posed by economic uncertainties become uninsurable because all members of the
group are affected.

In the case of the longshore industry model, this would

indicate that the pension mechanism is not a viable option for providing postretirement income to retirees from the labor force.

Rather than participate

in a pension program covering their industry, members of the longshore labor
force would be better advised to either purchase an insurance policy which may
be converted to an annuity upon retirement, or simply save in anticipation of
retirel"lent.
On

the basis of the previous discussions, the role of pensions in a

system for providing post-retirement income maintenance is clarified.

Retirement

from the work force is necessitated by a combination of factors, including the
changing labor needs of our industrial economy and the deterioration of work
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skills in later life.

The prevalence of retirement has given rise to a private

pension system which in conjunction with private insurance, individual savings
and social insurance forms the retirement income maintenance system.

Of the

four elements of this sytem, only social insurance provides near universal
coverage for the members of the labor force.

However, because benefits paid

by the social security system in the United States provide a basic, and not an
adequate level of retirement income, individuals facing the inevitability of
retirement are forced to take the initiative if they are to have an adequate
retirement income.

The individual must choose one, and preferably more than

one of the other elements of the retirement income maintenance system to supplement their social security benefits.
Given this situation, the private pension has come to be utilized increasingly and in most cases has proven to be a sufficient means of providng an
adequate post-retirement income.

However, as the exercise involving the model

longshore labor force indicates, reliance upon the pension instrument is a
mistake in some instances.
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